|Defense Information Superiority and Information Assurance (4) |
Defense Information Superiority and Information Assurance (4)
Statement of Lieutenant General William H. Campbell, Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4) Headquarters, Department of the Army. Washington, 106th Congress - Tuesday, February 23, 1999 - Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development. The subcommittees will receive testimony on Defense Information Superiority and Information Assurance. Part 4:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the US Army's perspective on Information Superiority as we prepare your Army to enter the 21st Century. I'll address our vision and some of the actions the Army is taking to achieve Information Superiority and Information Assurance. I've submitted a written statement that addresses these topics, so I'll limit my oral remarks to a brief summary of how we intend to employ Information Technology to improve force effectiveness on the Battlefield and to achieve efficiencies in the institutional Army.
As you know, since WWII the US has embraced high technology as a fundamental pillar in our National Defense Strategy. The most notable example of this technology-based strategy during the Cold War was nuclear weapons and their deployment systems. In the 21st Century we believe the high technology that will provide a decisive advantage is Information Technology (IT) employed in our weapons systems, sensors, logistics systems and command and control systems. Our vision for achieving Information Superiority is codified in Army Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2010. We also plan to use Information Technology and the Best Business Practices that this technology enables as a means to empower the Army to become more efficient and effective in executing our institutional and Title 10 missions.
For the past five years one of the Army's highest priorities has been to "digitize the battlefield." Our campaign objectives are to build digitized tactical and operational Forces for deployment in all potential modes ranging from small unit operations of the type conducted by Special Operations Forces to large-scale deployments with Joint Task Forces (JTF). Our concept for digitizing the Institutional Army to achieve economies and efficiencies, as envisioned by the Defense Reform Initiatives, ranges from recruiting and mobilization, through Distance Learning and Telemedicine, to Electronic Commerce and Knowledge Management and a host of other functions.
Information Superiority and Dominance are the central organizing principles for Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) and Army Vision 2010 (AV 2010). The information network will be the integrating mechanism for the joint and combined warfighting team. The fundamental precept for JV 2010 is to leverage information technology to achieve Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics and Full Dimensional Protection.
Within the Army our main focus has been on digitizing the tactical forces to provide full spectrum dominance through the use of computers, digital communications and embedded Information Technology. We are embedding computers in virtually all Weapons Systems and we're supporting them by leveraging the emerging Information Super Highway. Because we are predominantly a CONUS based Force we are using the Information Super Highway to connect deployed forces to the installations from which they were deployed to a theater of operations.
The Army of the 21st Century must be modernized continuously through technology insertion to achieve and sustain Information Superiority and Information Dominance. This is not a static end state; it's a continuous process. Our imperative is to use this technology to maintain a decisive edge in any environment ranging from Major Regional Conflicts to Military Operations Other than War. And since the Army will fight as part of a Joint and Combined Force, we must acquire systems that interoperate with our sister services and coalition partners.
Connectivity of CONUS based facilities to deployed Forces worldwide requires wide area networking as provided by the DISN. Adequate end-to-end connectivity also depends on a robust and reliable digital infrastructure on our Posts, Camps and Stations in CONUS and high capacity communications deployed with the tactical and operational forces. To achieve this digital connectivity we envision exploiting commercial technology to the maximum extent practical, complemented by the assured and protected communications provided by military owned and operated systems such as the MILSTAR constellation. We envision forces equipped with the IT necessary to enable the Network-centric Warfare concepts as described by Admiral Cebrowski. Our goal is to digitize our entire force from Soldiers at the "pointed end of the spear" equipped with miniaturized Land Warrior systems through each succeeding echelon to the command centers at the Joint Task Force level and higher.
Our vision of a digitized Army is focused on the Warfighter, providing our Soldiers with unprecedented levels of situational awareness; access to critical and timely information with near real time sensor to shooter connectivity and a reach back from wherever they're called upon to defend our national interests. During the first decade of the 21st Century, the Army will be moving toward knowledge-based land warfare, specifically creating a mentally agile force. To achieve this capability, the Army intends to field its first digitized division in the year 2000, the first digitized corps by 2004, and a fully digitized force by 2010.
None of this will be easy. Nor will it be inexpensive. The Army's digitization efforts are included in over 100 program elements and budget lines because computers are integral to virtually all new systems. We are working hard to meet the challenges of integrating these systems through the use of standards, a common joint architecture, and commercial technology packaged to operate in a military environment. We are committed to Joint interoperability; Joint developments, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System; commercial best practices, such as those using the power of the Internet; and cooperative efforts to secure our digital infrastructure against hostile attack or exploitation.
We look forward to working in close partnership with OSD, the Joint Staff, our Sister Services, and the Congress as we modernize America's Army and sustain continuous Information Superiority. We will need your help in a broad range of activities; from providing resources to helping protect the Military Frequency Spectrum from being auctioned off and to helping reform our acquisition processes so that we can insert Information Technology upgrades in our systems on short cycles, as the commercial world does, without the exhaustive requirements imposed upon industrial technology. This completes my summary.
Protecting the Frequency Spectrum
Spectrum availability is essential to warfighting and support systems. For example, Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Patriot Missiles, Global Positioning System etc… all rely on the military’s accesses to the spectrum. Digitization requires greater electromagnetic spectrum access rather than less. Our ability to enhance command and control on the move, provide reach back and to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information to the warfighters is critically dependent upon unimpeded access to this critical national resource. As you are aware, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has established policies and guidelines for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by ALL Federal Government agencies. The Army is OBLIGATED to comply with these policies. Public Law 104-28 charges Federal agencies for costs associated with spectrum management, analysis, operations, and related services.
One of the dilemmas we face is that the electromagnetic spectrum is of great value to both military and commercial applications. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993 (OBRA 93) and the Balanced Budget Act 1997 (BBA 97) mandated rapid electromagnetic spectrum reallocations. The DOD, as primary users of this portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, will experience major costs impacts and impairments to critical missions as a result of the reallocations. The chart below illustrates the impact of 2 congressional actions only. The total of proposed and actual reallocations exceeds 1500 MHz.
The Department of Defense realizes that the electromagnetic spectrum is under intense assault by the private sector. The Department of Defense must have confidence that (it) will have access to the electromagnetic spectrum. If the Department of Defense is going to be displaced from parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, then compensation to accommodate the displacement is necessary.
Securing Information Technology
We recognize that IT is not the sole domain of US Forces. We also recognize that our dependence on IT creates potential vulnerabilities that we must mitigate. Our response must be one of continual vigilance and evolutionary modernization of information security capabilities to insure we retain a decisive advantage. This includes giving our Soldiers technology that will allow them to see farther, shoot further, shoot first and mass the effects of our weapons systems through real time digital coordination and synchronization on any battlefield. Our continuous improvement process mandates the use of main stream commercial standards and Joint Technical Architectures to accommodate continual modernization through technology insertion in to our weapons platforms. This technology must be integrated not only with computer and communications systems but also with sensors, shooters and self-protection devices that are integral to modern weapons platforms.
We recognize that for every measure there is a countermeasure, particularly in the electronic and IT networking domain. We take Information Assurance very seriously. Consequently we are embracing a "Red Teaming" concept to identify weakness in our operational and institutional information systems employing electronic and IT capabilities and we are taking proactive measures to provide Information Assurance. We have a robust and aggressive Network Security Improvement Program (NSIP) and a responsive Intrusion Detection and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) notification process with well-defined procedures to respond quickly in the event of either an intrusion or penetration. We have established positive control; 24X7.
As the transition from a forward presence of deployed forces to global power projection from CONUS and overseas bases, many of the functional differences between deployed forces and the power projection base will become transparent. Many critical functions that were once performed within the battlespace (e.g., intelligence, logistics) will be located at the power projection bases. The full effect of modern precision fire power, maneuver capabilities, and split-based operations resident on the 21st Century battlefield will not be realized without investing sufficiently in protecting the information infrastructure that binds these components together.
Finally, of particular concern as we build this "high tech" force is the recruiting and retention of a "high tech" work force. It is clear that we will be able to capitalize on "Information Age" primary and secondary education but the competition in the private sector will be daunting. Enhancements in educational benefits and bonuses along with a more competitive pay system will go a long way to ameliorate this detractor. We are also capitalizing on Computer Based Training capabilities to raise the "IT IQ" throughout the Force. As these capabilities expand and improve along with Distance Learning, unimpeded and encouraged access to this type of high tech education will become an incredible incentive to our youth. The good news is that we have a validated process in place. But this process is a journey, not a static end-state.
Digitizing the battlefield
As stated up front, one of the US Army’s top priority requirements for Force XXI is "Digitizing the Battlefield." Digitizing the Battlefield is the application of information technologies to establish networks that will allow us to acquire, exchange, and employ timely digital information throughout the battlespace, tailored to the needs of each decider (commander), shooter, and supporter...allowing each to maintain a clear and accurate vision of the joint/combined battlespace necessary to support both planning and execution. Our goal is to provide our Soldiers at all echelons something we call situational awareness by using IT to build a common operational picture of the battlespace. This answers three enduring critical elements of information required by all warfighters; "Where am I? Where are my Buddies? Where is the Enemy?"
The Army’s ongoing Horizontal Technology Integration program extends technological improvements to all elements fighting together. The initiatives "Own the Night," "Combat Identification," and "Battlefield Digitization" include a group of near-term modernization programs that significantly enhance combat effectiveness.
The Command and Control System that will tie all of this together is the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). The Army Battle Command System is the critical framework to ensure the seamless integration and interoperability of tomorrow’s digitized battlefield and provide situational awareness to the warfighter. Current doctrine relies on the warfighter to be able to:
- See & understand the current state of the battlefield
- Visualize how the battlefield is developing
- Deliver his intent and concept of the operation to his staff and
- Force his will on the enemy
ABCS fields digitized command and control (C2) capability with modernized tactical operations centers, enhanced Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) fielded down to battalion level, and digital battle command and situational awareness capability from platform to Echelons above Corps, interfaced with Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and Coalition C2 systems via Global Command and Control System - Army (GCCS-A). Failure to provide this capability will impact the warfighters’ ability to (1) achieve the common relevant picture through a seamless, tailorable, interoperable, automated battle command system, and (2) receive and process time-sensitive C2 information to shorten the decision cycle process. ABCS will provide real time, accurate information. It will ensure that our warfighters can plan, prepare and execute military operations faster and more decisively than the enemy. ABCS is the bridge between how we command and control today to that required to execute military operations in the 21st century. It will be a seamless, interoperable battle command system that digitally links the entire battlefield. It provides the commander the ability to remain connected to his sustaining base when conducting split base operations. ABCS will give the Army the ability to fight and win on the 21st century information battlefield. It gives commanders the means to plan, prepare for, and execute military operations faster than any future enemy commander.
The ATCCS components Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the Forward Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence System (FAADC2I), the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), and the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), all provide critical support to battlefield commanders. Of greater importance is their feed to the Maneuver Control System, (MCS) which will provide the operational commander true situational awareness and feed essential elements of information to higher echelons.
The Warfighter Information Network (WIN) is the Army’s plan to ensure that we have the ability to pass information throughout the strategic, operational and tactical level. WIN is an integrated C4 umbrella concept that is comprised of commercially based, high technology information communication systems. WIN is designed to increase the capacity and velocity of information distribution throughout the battlespace.
WIN consists of seven components: Power Projection Platforms, Satellite Transport, Terrestrial Transport, Tactical Internet/Combat Net Radio, Information Services, Tactical Information Systems, and Network Management. The major benefits of WIN are: simultaneous voice, data, and video, more efficient use of bandwidth, lower numbers of different systems in inventory, multi-level security, and leveraged commercial satellite services.
The major fielding milestones will be to provide Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Switch technology, High Capacity Line of Sight Radio (HCLOS), and High Speed Routers to First Digitized Division (FDD) by FY00, the First Digitized Corps (FDC) (III Corps) by FY04 and the remainder of Army with same capability as the FDD by FY10.
The final key to winning the information war is our Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) that through the Tactical Internet will provide true, real time situational awareness.
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is a sub-element and a key component of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). FBCB2, as a key component of the ABCS, is the critical framework to ensure the seamless integration and interoperability of tomorrow’s digitized battlefield. FBCB2 is a digital, battle command information system that provides mounted/dismounted tactical combat, combat support and combat service support commanders, leaders and soldiers integrated, on-the-move, real-time/near-real time, battle command information and situational awareness from brigade down to the soldier/platform level across all Battlefield Functional Areas (BFAs). FBCB2 is located in the mounted and dismounted maneuver (divisional, separate, heavy and light) cavalry/reconnaissance, and armored cavalry, mechanized infantry, infantry and aviation units; FBCB2 integrates with Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) located within the Brigade and Battalion and will provide the common relevant picture at the strategic level. FBCB2 integrates emerging and existing communication, weapon, and sensor systems to facilitate automated status, positional, situational, and combat awareness reporting.
- FBCB2 integrates numerous existing command and control capabilities enabling the sharing of critical battlefield information in near real time, which previously was not readily accessible.
- FBCB2, a battle command information system, provides the technology to complete the ABCS information flow process from brigade to platform and across all platforms within the brigade task force. Additionally, FBCB2 will provide commanders the ability to remotely operate and maintain ABCS database connectivity regardless of command vehicle, and to digitally control and monitor their subordinate units status and position.
- FBCB2 provides a fully integrated command and control capability from the strategic level to the Platoon Leader, including joint and multinational capabilities.
- Provides timely and accurate friendly locations, reducing the potential for fratricide.
- Provides a significant increase in the ability of commanders and leaders at all levels to quickly synchronize forces and fires and rapidly make decisions to increase operational tempo.
- Achieves shared situational awareness which provides a clear and accurate common picture of battlespace to commanders at all levels.
- Leverages significant advances in information technologies from the civilian sector (e.g., portable laptop computers, internet technology, direct broadcast TV).
The Tactical Internet (TI), a communications infrastructure and as a sub-element of Army Battle Command System (ABCS), is critical in digitizing the battlespace to provide command and control capability throughout the force. This requires a horizontally and vertically integrated digital information network that supports warfighting systems at Corps and Below and assures command and control decision cycle superiority.
Tactical Internet is composed of three current systems – the Enhanced position Location Reporting System (EPLRS); the Single Channel Ground and Airborne radio System (SINCGARS); and the Mobile Subscriber Equipment/Tactical Packet Network (MSE/TPN). These will be connected to form a single, seamless, data-communications system for digitized Army brigades, divisions, and corps. The Tactical Internet (TI) will promote information sharing, and will be readily available to every authorized user with access to the network. The Tactical Internet will be critical to achieving situational awareness on the battlefield at brigade and below. The revolutionary potential of the Tactical Internet becomes clear when one examines the way the Army has been used to doing business in the past. Most importantly, the Tactical Internet promotes situational awareness (SA) among tactical forces, which means that all friendly parties – commanders and subordinates – have a common understanding of the battlespace. In addition, the Tactical Internet provides a means to rapidly and clearly communicate information and orders: The TI will support key services such as messaging, directory, network management, and security.
The TI will provide the warfighter a data communications infrastructure that provides a gateway to strategic networks, e.g. Single Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET.)
The use of open commercial data communications standards greatly facilitates incorporation of new technology as it emerges.
The TI is the centerpiece of "digitization" – the digital conduit that transports information to improve lethality, increase tempo, and enhance survivability.
Even with the ongoing SINCGARS, EPLRS, and MSE/TPN enhancements, the channel capacity of the Tactical Internet is insufficient. The Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR) temporarily fills a void as a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to TOC data hauler in time for the First Digitized Division (FDD) in FY00. It is based on commercial technology that was successfully demonstrated during the November 1997 Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). The NTDR strategy incorporates important lessons learned and technology breakthroughs that will expedite transition to a Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) that will satisfy future wide-band networked data radio capability.
The NTDR strategy meshes with the JTRS development strategy. It is a gap-filler needed between current fielded radio capabilities and JTRS. The NTDR brings an additional 288 KiloBits Per Second (KBPS) at the tactical level to serve as a bridge until a JTRS for ground components is available for fielding.
Key to achieving Joint Interoperability in the Theater of Operation will be the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS is more than a radio. It is the first component necessary to build a Joint Tactical Internet. Succinctly, it is a multiband, multimode, software programmable, network capable radio. This is truly a revolutionary way of looking at a radio system.
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) will not only stem the proliferation of independent, non-interoperable solutions for a programmable radio, but will meet new and emerging requirements for information dominance on the digitized battlefield through enhanced voice, data, and video communication. JTRS will perform in a most flexible manner and be designed as a family of advanced, reliable, and dynamic communications platforms, while providing operational forces with an upgraded communications capability and ensuring interoperability among Joint and coalition forces.
The JTRS will consist of a core set of common requirements supplemented by specific requirements for ground forces, airborne, maritime, and fixed domains. JTRS will provide affordable, high capacity, tactical communications to meet the bandwidth needs of various echelons using a family of digital, modular, software programmable radios, ranging from a low cost joint tactical radio to a higher capacity, joint multi-band, multi-mode radio communications. The JTRS configuration includes imbedded communications security (COMSEC) and Global Positioning System (GPS) as well as common hardware (modular and scalable). JTRS will be compatible with legacy systems, and must have the capacity to import commercial and future military waveforms.
Digitizing the installation
As a CONUS based power projection Army, the deployed corps/division rear boundary is the installation or sustaining base. Since the battlefield is being digitized, then the installation must also be digitized. Our key program to modernize the installation is an umbrella program called PPC4I. We call the architectural master plan the Installation Information Infrastructure Architecture (I3A):
I3A is an enterprise network, which includes a mixture of commercial and military assets that enable dynamic data routing. The network will be standards based and will contain adaptable pathways of high capacity voice, data, imagery, video service communications links; lightweight, mobile tactical systems; fiber optics, data gateways; and modern switching technology. PPC4I leverages this infrastructure along with increased reliability on space-based systems (e.g., Satellites and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), to support split-based operations, operations in urban areas, and to provide connectivity among deployed forces.
PPC4I includes all Army Installations (Power Projection Platforms, Power Support Platforms, and the Other Remaining Installations). Power Projection Platforms: Carson, Riley, Sill, Bliss, Lewis, Hood, Bragg, Benning, Polk, Stewart, Campbell, Drum, Dix, McCoy, and Eustis. Power Support Platforms: Rucker, Shelby, Knox, Roberts, Huachuca, Leonard Wood, Lee, Chambersburg, Jackson, APG, Buchanan, and Gowen Field.
The components of PPC4I are four major initiatives to modernize the digital infrastructure of Army installations to enable us to "import best commercial practices" and labor saving technology).
a. Outside Cable Rehabilitation: Puts in a high capacity "fiber backbone" on installations (similar to the main roads). Replaces aged (totally inadequate) copper. It is a key ENABLER for implementing a Revolution in Military Logistics Affairs, Business Process Reengineering, and importing other commercial best practices.
b. Common User Installation Transport Network: Provides "servers" and cables to connect the backbone to buildings and distribution nodes for high-speed data transfer on post.
c. Army Defense Information System Network (DISN) Router Program: Provides "gateways" to the DISN (off-post connections) and network management capabilities.
d. MACOM Telephone Modernization Program: Provides modern digital "switches" and linkage to users.
Digitizing the Installation enables us to Reengineer how we do business, support the Defense Reform Initiatives and support deployed warfighters with reach back capabilities. Examples of what this enables are:
a. Linkage to Deployed Forces and Split Based Operations. Realize potential of GCSS-A, GCCS, and technologies for virtual meeting and collaboration among commanders.
b. Distance Learning connectivity. Revolution in Training Army-wide.
c. Knowledge Management and Web-based access institutionalized Army-wide.
d. Electronic commerce. Paperless contracting. Wal-Mart-like inventory control. Total Asset Visibility. Just in time logistics and major reduction in storage/stockage. Revolution in Military Logistics. Efficiencies. Soldier and staff officer connections to Defense Travel Service. Smart card exploitation across multiple functional areas.
e. Teleconferencing, collaborative planning, white-boarding, reduced TDY.
g. Defense Reform Initiatives. If we're not connected, we'll be unable to execute effectively (e.g., when OSD shuts down the printing plants and publishes via the web or CD-ROMs, we need to be connected or XEROX mega-pages at Army expense).
h. Keeps the Army in synch with the commercial (off post) digital infrastructure and allows us to import best practices from the commercial world. We can't have it both ways -- if we want to import commercial practices we have to have the infrastructure these practices assume are in place.
Revolution in business affairs and acquisition reform
In the past, the improvement of military forces could be characterized as part of an arms race; however, in the future, this race will be one of modernization, emphasizing continuous improvements in information, processes, and transactions. Through C4I/IT, the Army will combine the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) of the Operational Army with the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) of the Institutional Army to develop a unified approach that will allow the Army to perform efficiently as one team. The Operational Army will undergo an evolutionary change in C4I/IT from oday's platform-centric environment to the network-centric construct of Army XXI. Concurrently, the Institutional Army will incorporate industry's best practices and achieve the flexibility to adapt to the changing business space.
One of our key successes in technology insertion is the Warfighter's Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). Although streamlined we have instituted a disciplined and rigorous process to insure that only the most critical needs are meet. Current approved WRAP initiatives include: Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT-XXI), HEMTT- Load Handling System (LHS), Medical Logistics-Division (MEDLOG-D), Rifle Launched Entry Munition (RLEM), Tactical Personnel System (TPS), and the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer
The Army has experienced success with acquisition reform to reduce cost and time in the acquisition process through the Spiral Development process. An icon of industry and government cooperation in spiral development is the Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF) at Ft Hood, Texas. Rapid development with primary focus on resolving interoperability issues among disparate platforms and responding quickly to user assessment is achieved by strict adherence to the JTA and forging strategic alliances among industry and government members. The CTSF validates technology with Soldiers in the Loop.
There is a key point to be made about development with Soldiers in the Loop. Today, our young Soldiers are more likely to believe an "icon on a screen" than the "old guard." This is not a pejorative statement but a statement of fact. The "old guard" preserves the Warrior Spirit and instills the same in our young Soldiers. This context has guided our approach to adapting IT for our Forces. We have inserted IT in such a way as to capitalize on these two critical attributes; insertion of high technology without undermining the warrior spirit but enhancing it.
As we modernize this process, the Army is moving toward a paperless acquisition process by fielding the Standard Procurement System (SPS) in conjunction with JCALS. The goal of this capability is to create a totally paper-free acquisition process, providing leaders with critical information, at a moments notice, that will enable the Army to modernize better, cheaper, and faster. Continued emphasis is required to develop acceptance of bolder revisions that will enable managers in both the Army and industry to streamline further to process and reduce the cost and time to develop and field systems.
In conclusion, I believe that the Army has seized upon a highly compelling vision of its future role in land warfare. We have thought through a comprehensive process that has determined the key science and technology investments required to achieve this vision. By making the right investments in our force development and modernization now, the Army of the 21st Century will have the decisive edge when and if called upon to defend our nation's interests, at home or abroad. The future Army and the United States will be the beneficiaries of this cooperative and challenging effort.