NATO’s Political and Military Transformation: Two Sides of the Same Coin
NATO’s Political and Military
Transformation: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Transforming NATO A Political and Military Challenge: Speech by
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General,
at NATO Annual Conference,
Brussels, Sodehotel, April 14, 2005.
Ministers, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good morning and welcome. Nothing is more important for NATO’s continued
effectiveness than the success of its transformation process both political and
military. Which is why I chose transformation as the theme for this, my first
NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop
Let me begin by thanking NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division which has put a
tremendous amount of work into organising today’s event. Let me also thank the
Royal United Services Institute and Allied Command Transformation, which are
co-sponsoring this year’s conference.
At NATO, transformation is nothing new. But it is fair to say that changes
during NATO’s first 40 years were relatively gradual and comparatively small.
Changes over the past 16 years, however, have been much more sudden and
far-reaching. Today’s NATO is preserving security and projecting stability in
ways and in places that could not have been imagined just a few years ago. And
it is my responsibility to ensure that the transformation agenda carries on
delivering, not just today, but also tomorrow and into the future.
What I intend to do over the next few minutes is to review the progress we have
already made with the transformation of our military capabilities. Then, I will
explain why we should widen our transformation lens to include promoting much
deeper and broader political dialogue. And I will touch on a specific area where
I believe dialogue and coordination will be of ever-increasing importance: post-conflict
stabilisation and reconstruction.
Let me start by reviewing where we are now with our military transformation. It
is not in the nature of a Secretary General to be easily satisfied. And while we
have made progress over the past few years, there is a lot more work to be done.
We will hear a little later from Admiral Giambastiani about the
work he is driving forward within that command. But le me say that it is already
paying dividends in the way we do business in the Alliance, and in our
operations and missions as well.
The Prague Capabilities Commitment was launched just over two years ago. That
too, has made progress but not enough. Nations have undertaken specific
commitments to overcome shortfalls in four key operational capability areas:
CBRN defence, information superiority, combat effectiveness, and deployability
and sustainability. Capabilities key to success in modern operations.
Now, I know that the development, acquisition, and fielding of new capabilities
is a lengthy process. And we have already moved the yard-sticks forward when it
comes to air and sea lift within NATO. But we should be clear. There is a major
lack of strategic transport in the European inventories.
We need more of our own strategic transport, and some other key enablers as well
from air-to-air refuelling, to helicopters, to combat support and combat service
support. And until we have them, we will simply not be able to move as fast or
as far, and be as effective as we might need to be, in the face of a real
The NATO Response Force is designed to give the Alliance some of that speed and
reach. We have achieved Initial Operating Capability of the NRF, within two
years. And it is a substantial capability. This is a robust and fully joint
force that is at high readiness, technologically advanced, deployable within 5
to 30 days, and sustainable. It has utility across the full range of Alliance
missions. Next year, by October, we will see the Force reach its Full
Operational Capability, which will represent a major step up in Alliance
The NRF is clearly no substitute for the normal force generation required for
operations; nor should it be kept on a shelf forever to gather dust. To my mind,
we shouldn’t get too caught up in theological debates. When circumstances demand
that we use the NRF, we will know it. And we should not hesitate, in those
circumstances, to do so. For example, if the Asian tsunami had happened closer
to the NATO area, I have little doubt we would have deployed the NRF.
All of the initiatives I just mentioned focus primarily on getting the right
capabilities into our resource pool. But we have a second challenge: to ensure
that these capabilities are available when required.
force generation process now takes a more comprehensive and longer-term view of
our military commitments, in order to provide Allies with greater warning of the
requirements. It also now provides a clearer overview of how Allies contribute
across all our operations and reassures contributors that plans are in place to
The first of these new style force generation conferences was held last November,
and the intention is to hold them annually. We are now looking at the lessons to
be drawn from the first conference, and we are also considering how best to
involve Partners and other non-NATO nations in the process. But it is already
clear that this approach makes sense.
Last year, Defence Ministers agreed that 40 per cent of each nation’s land
forces should be structured and equipped for deployed operations, and that at
any one time, 8 per cent would be either be engaged on, or earmarked for,
sustained operations. This work on usability is well under way, but here, it is
clear that further work needs to be done. We need to ensure that all nations are
using the same baseline, and we need to consider how to include air and maritime
forces as well.
capabilities, such as hospitals, airfields and ports, aren’t just used by
individual nations. They are theatre-level functions, and they should be
eligible for common funding. That is why we are developing funding mechanisms
that will ease the financial burden for nations providing these critical
capabilities for their Allies and partners in the field.
Which brings me to defence budgets overall. It will come as no surprise that I
am not pleased with the general trend in defence spending in NATO. With some
notable exceptions, the trend is down.
I am all for spending taxpayers’ money more efficiently. As a long-time
politician, I could have no other view. But the reality is that restructuring
costs. It cannot be done on the cheap. So nations will keep hearing from me to
spend what it takes to meet their defence requirements even if I admit that
sometimes I feel like Jerry McGuire, continually asking nations to “show me the
So, overall: we have succeeded in changing and improving the way we do our
business. We have moved away from purely individual national efforts and
achieved much greater coordination and cooperation across the Alliance.
Improvements to our capabilities have been made, and we have developed
procedures to make it easier for nations to commit the capabilities to NATO
operations. But that most definitely does not mean that we should now sit back
and rest on our laurels. We must maintain the momentum. And I will do my part to
keep it up.
That is the state of play, to my mind, on our current capabilities. But military
capabilities are only one part of transformation. They will be worthless if
Allies cannot agree on how, when and where to use them. Which brings me to the
importance of NATO as a forum for political dialogue to help the transatlantic
Allies share views, shape consensus and, where necessary, to take action
That is also what Chancellor Schroeder was getting at in his speech for the
Munich Security Conference a few weeks ago. It is something I have been saying
almost since I took over this post. And while NATO has been strong on action
over the past few years, the Alliance has been less strong on dialogue.
Next week, when our Foreign Ministers meet informally in Vilnius, I will present
to them my ideas for further enhancing political dialogue within NATO. And to my
mind, the logic of doing this is as clear as its importance.
NATO’s founding charter makes the Alliance’s mission clear: to safeguard the
freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. And to
do that, we must consult closely, continually and freely on any topics and could
affect our freedom and our security. This is a fundamental task of the Alliance.
If we want to agree on how to act together; if we want to guide military
transformation in a coherent, multinational way; then we need full, open and
transparent political discussions. Our operations and missions take place, and
themselves affect, the political context we need an ongoing political dialogue
to help shape them. The same is true for our partnerships. And a broad political
dialogue within NATO is essential to build and maintain support in our publics
and Parliaments, because the old Cold War automaticity is long gone.
But we need more than just discussions within NATO. Given the global nature of
the security challenges we face, the Alliance also needs a more structured
political dialogue with other international organisations, especially the United
Nations and the European Union.
It would be foolish and wasteful not to make the
most of the synergies between these international organisations in the places
where we so often work side-by-side.
Usually, practice follows theory. In the case of cooperation between NATO and
the UN, practice has come first. In the Balkans, as well as in Afghanistan, NATO
and the UN have worked effectively together for years. But this cooperation has
developed ad-hoc, and without the same level of cooperation at the strategic
level. It is in the interests of both organisations that we now develop a more
structured approach to our relationship.
In July, the United Nations will host a meeting with regional organisations and
with NATO, and will discuss the implications of the United Nations High Level
Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change in preparation for the UN General
Assembly in September. There are a number of practical areas where NATO support
to UN operations might be a good idea, and we will look into that in the coming
months. Because I believe the time has come for closer NATO-UN cooperation.
We also need to strengthen the relationship, and the dialogue, with the European
Union. And let me be frank there is plenty of room for improvement. The NAC-PSC
agendas are getting very thin, when they should be broad. We should be
discussing all the areas where both organisations are engaged, to support each
other and to avoid duplication. Except for the Balkans, we don’t. There are also
critical issues of capability development that need to be explored more fully,
for example harmonising commitments to the EU’s Battle Groups and the NRF.
The NATO-EU agenda is artificially constrained for reasons which can, and should
be put behind us as soon as possible. NATO and the European Union both work to
build security and promote democracy and freedom. That is why both organisations
are already involved in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in North Africa and in the
Middle East. And as the membership of our two organisations increasingly
overlaps, I am convinced that closer cooperation will become inevitable.
I say very clearly cooperation, and not competition. It is naïve to imagine that
the European Union can develop a military capability to rival that of NATO,
which includes the US. It would be equally naïve to propose that NATO should
develop the civil capabilities available within the European Union.
Both organisations have comparative advantages. The EU has huge expertise in
police training, judicial reform, economic assistance, and reconstruction. NATO
has robust military capabilities, and long experience in peace operations. While
both organisations can be effective in isolation, we can do more good bring more
security, to more people if we talk and work together.
And that applies very much to post conflict and stabilisation operations more
broadly; not only to win the war, but also to win the peace. Indeed, I believe
that we must focus much more on that phase of our operations; after the hard
combat is over, but before peace is self-sustaining. Because post conflict and
stabilisation operations are going to be a big part of what we do, as an
international community. And with some fresh thinking, and broader cooperation,
we can get results.
Look at the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept that we pioneered in
Afghanistan. These teams include both military and civilian elements, working
alongside each other. Alone, the soldiers couldn’t help rebuild the country.
Without security embedded security, in this case the civilians wouldn’t be as
effective. And it works. As Kofi Annan remarked only last month, you can’t have
security without development, and you can’t have development without security.
We need to better integrate and harmonise the security, stabilisation and
reconstruction efforts at an early stage in the process. We also need to develop
more structured mechanisms for cooperating with other international
organisations, non governmental organisations, and other agencies an enhanced
external political dialogue mirroring the deeper and broader political dialogue
within NATO itself.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have covered a lot of ground. So let me summarise the key points. We have made
significant progress in improving the quality, quantity and availability of
certain key military capabilities. We have also succeeded in improving the
procedures that enable nations to contribute those capabilities to NATO-led
operations. We need to keep up the pressure in all these areas. And we must now
also start to consider how to enhance international coordination for post
conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in particular between international
However, all these transformed military capabilities are worthless if Allies
don’t conduct the political dialogue necessary to agree how, when, and where to
use them. An enhanced role for NATO as a forum for discussion of the security
issues affecting Allies is therefore absolutely essential. That is why I remain
convinced that political transformation and military transformation are two
sides of the same coin. You can’t have one without the other. And I will be a
determined engineer, and driver, of both.