Russia’s FIMI operations in Africa are not fleeting campaigns but an embedded, adaptive and persistent feature of the information environment. Russia aims to reshape public perception, undermine Western influence, and advance its own long-term, geopolitical objectives on the continent.
By EUvsDisinfo | April 28, 2025 —
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Africa has increasingly become a geopolitical battleground, and nowhere is this clearer than in the information space. Recent findings in the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats show that Russia, in particular, has significantly expanded its FIMI operations across the continent, employing a long-term, multi-layered strategy that embeds itself within the region’s information landscape.
In 2022, following the EU’s suspension of state-controlled RT and Sputnik, Russia executed a strategic pivot. Not forgetting Europe, it redirected its manipulative firepower, and adapted its tactics, to deepen its influence in Africa, capitalising on regional political shifts and positioning itself as a counterforce to the West.
Russia’s African playbook
Unlike the more overt push seen recently in Moldova, Russia’s approach to FIMI in Africa blends the visible with the clandestine, building on years of activity, including operations previously linked to the Wagner Group. The strategy relies on an integrated network of state media, covertly run outlets, diplomatic channels, and crucially, local amplifiers.
Overt operations
Russian state-controlled outlets operate on two levels. Global outlets like TASS and RIA Novosti provide the baseline narratives, while local branches such as RT Africa and Sputnik Afrique tailor content for the continent. Russian diplomatic missions, particularly embassies in key countries like Kenya and South Africa, often serve as late-stage amplifiers, pushing official Russian positions.
Covert and state-linked hubs
Plunging into the more obscure parts of the ecosystem, we find seemingly local media outlets and social media accounts that have been designed to mask their ties to the Kremlin.
- African Initiative: This ‘media’ entity has emerged as a central hub for Russian FIMI in Africa. It stepped into the void left by Wagner-affiliated media operations after Wagner-chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death. African Initiative masquerades as an ‘independent press agency,’ but is in reality run by individuals linked to Russian intelligence services (FSB and GRU), and has been sanctioned by the EU. It operates in multiple languages, with local branches in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) serving as Russia’s primary ‘information bridge,’ amplifying Kremlin narratives while also engaging in offline activities such as journalist training and other events to cement its presence.
- Portal Kombat: This sprawling network of websites, also known as the Pravda ecosystem or network, uses automated republication tactics that systematically amplify and repost content originating from African Initiative. It targets specific regional audiences through numerous websites across the continent (including in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and many others), saturating local information spaces with pro-Kremlin narratives.
- The vital role of local networks: Perhaps the most insidious part of the strategy is the cultivation and leveraging of local amplifiers. Russia relies heavily on a vast ecosystem of seemingly local, but often inauthentic, websites, social media channels and influencers. These channels have been reported to receive payments, but give Russian narratives a veneer of local resonance and credibility. They show consistent patterns of synchronisation with Kremlin messaging, and play a crucial role in embedding FIMI content deep within regional echo chambers, blurring the lines between attributed and non-attributed sources.
Russian FIMI architecture in Africa
Information laundering
Russia employs a two-way information laundering technique in Africa. Centrally produced narratives are filtered and tailored for local audiences via networks like African Initiative and its local amplifiers. At the same time, African Initiative generates content that feeds back into Russia’s international state media ecosystem through channels like Sputnik Afrique, lending it artificial legitimacy on a global scale.
Online and offline integration
Beyond purely online activity, Russia’s FIMI playbook in Africa includes offline techniques. Events, demonstrations, and cooperation with local associations, (like the African Initiative Association in Burkina Faso), are used to reinforce Russia’s strategic positioning and spread narratives in multiple languages.
Familiar narratives, tailored delivery
The narratives pushed by this manipulation machinery are consistent with Russia’s global anti-Western messaging, but importantly tailored for consumption by local African audiences. Key themes include:
- Portraying the West (especially France and the US) as exploitative neo-colonial powers responsible for instability.
- Framing Western policies on social issues (such as LGBTIQ+ rights) as attempts to undermine local traditions and values.
- Discrediting independent and Western media as propaganda outlets.
- Positioning Russia as a reliable ally, a defender of African interests, and a partner against terrorism.
- Emphasising strong Russia-Africa ties and claiming widespread African support for Russia’s geopolitical actions, including its war against Ukraine (often casting Ukraine in a negative light).
The long game
Russia’s FIMI operations in Africa are not fleeting campaigns but an embedded, adaptive and persistent feature of the information environment. By bringing together state assets, covert operations and local networks, Russia aims to reshape public perception, undermine Western influence, and advance its own long-term, geopolitical objectives on the continent.
