Doha indirect talks result in the unfreezing of $3 billion
By Michel Touma — Levant Time
Published Jul 01, 2026 – 11:29 PM
As the contours — and perhaps the unspoken elements — of the framework agreement reached between Washington and the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually and tentatively come into focus, two fundamental parameters that might be described as “peripheral” to the broader political process underway are emerging with increasing clarity: on one hand, internal Iranian divisions within the ruling establishment and the cracks now openly visible in the regime’s structure; and on the other, the steady, patient, and meticulous construction by the United States of what appears to be a new politico-military-security order in the region — one designed to clip the mullahs’ regime’s wings and reduce its extraterritorial influence to an absolute minimum.
The first of these two parameters complicates — and may even inhibit — what some, loosely speaking, call “dialogue and negotiations” between Washington and the Islamic Republic.
Several Iranian media outlets and credible, well-informed sources closely monitoring Iran’s internal situation have been reporting for days on serious fault lines shaking the mullah regime’s political apparatus at the highest levels.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the radical wing of the establishment has not lost its dominant influence, and it is making itself heard through fierce, public criticism directed at the so-called “moderate” or pragmatist camp, which managed to push through the framework agreement with the United States.
The radicals’ opposition has manifested in frontal attacks against the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, whose interview on Iranian state television a few days ago was abruptly cut short and taken off air before it could conclude.
The other “face” of the negotiations with the United States, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, was booed by Iranian pilgrims during his recent visit to Karbala, Iraq.
These setbacks prompted Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian to publicly denounce the campaign against the Iranian negotiators earlier this week.
The criticism, however, goes beyond targeting the negotiators personally — it extends more broadly and deeply to the policy direction of the Iranian president and the members of the Supreme National Security Council who gave the green light to the framework agreement signed with the United States.
Significantly, the attacks against President Pezeshkian and the negotiators are coming from high-ranking radical bodies that represent the backbone of the regime.
The Lebanese website Al-Janoubiya, which reflects the viewpoint of the Lebanese Shia opposition and is generally very well informed about the situation in Iran, reports that 63 of the 84 members of the regime’s “Assembly of Experts” recently published a statement calling on the Islamic Republic’s negotiators to adhere to the “red lines” set by the “wali al-faqih,” the Supreme Leader.
Al-Janoubiya further reports that the “administration of religious seminaries” (the “hawzat”), operating under the authority of the wali al-faqih, also issued a statement warning the Iranian president, the negotiators, and the members of the Supreme National Security Council against any “laxity” in upholding the red lines referenced in the document signed with Washington.
These internal tensions would explain why the Iranian delegation in Doha, which was expected to meet with American negotiators for technical-level talks, refused any direct negotiation.
The Iranian delegates were thus engaged in discussions with Pakistani mediators, while the American representatives were meeting separately with Qatari officials.
These indirect talks through Pakistani and Qatari mediators led to a symbolic measure: the unfreezing of $3 billion in frozen Iranian assets. This came after Tehran initially demanded the release of $12 billion, then settled for requesting the $6 billion frozen in Qatar — a demand it ultimately failed to secure.
Moreover, the $3 billion unlocked on Wednesday will be used to purchase humanitarian goods, most likely on the American market…
The New American Order
The second factor shaping the feverish game of chess unfolding in the region is the new American order — political, military, and security-related — that appears to be gradually taking shape across the Levant and, more broadly, throughout the entire region.
The signs of this US framework have become clearly visible over the past days and weeks.
The sequence of events on this front is particularly telling: on the eve of Lebanon and Israel signing the framework agreement under Washington’s auspices, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Bahrain with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial conference. Following that meeting, the Gulf states and Rubio issued a joint statement unequivocally backing the Lebanese government’s stance on direct negotiations with Israel. (The European Union also separately expressed its full support for Lebanon’s chosen approach.)
With the backing of the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf states, Lebanon signed its framework agreement with Israel. One of its key effects is to keep Iran out of the crisis-resolution and end-of-war process in Lebanon, thereby reinforcing the sovereigntist course charted by Beirut. The momentum built by President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and his government could involve direct American military participation — through experts and senior officers — in the phased deployment of the Lebanese army and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.
Significantly, the US House of Representatives voted by a wide margin earlier this week to reject a Democratic-sponsored resolution that would have imposed significant restrictions on any potential American military involvement in Lebanon. This US role was also discussed with Lebanese leaders during a visit to Beirut by CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper earlier in the week.
Three additional significant developments further illustrated the American process underway:
– A wave of arrests in Iraq targeting members of parliament, senior political figures, and businessmen close to the Iranian regime, as well as a decision taken 48 hours ago by the Iraqi government setting a deadline of September 30 for pro-Iranian militias to hand over their weapons to the state.
– The CENTCOM commander’s hosting this week in Bahrain of an expanded regional security and defense meeting with senior military officials from Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen.
– An announcement made twenty-four hours ago by the US Treasury Department regarding a decision by the member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) to impose measures against Hezbollah’s funding sources, including Qard el-Hassan.
Faced with this US dynamic, the Iranian regime is attempting to hold on to two trump cards it seeks to preserve: maintaining its dominant role in Lebanon (seriously called into question by the firm stance of the Lebanese authorities on this matter); and having its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz recognized, in disregard of international regulations and law on this issue.
In this regard, a senior American official told the Axios website that US negotiators have made clear to Iranian delegates present in Doha that Iran’s insistence on imposing transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz risks torpedoing the framework agreement between Washington and Tehran. A situation, therefore, to be closely watched…
Michel Touma
See also :
- Iranische Meinungsverschiedenheiten hemmen den Dialog mit den USA — (2026-0701)
- Les dissensions iraniennes inhibent le dialogue avec les USA — (2026-0701)
- Iranian Divisions Hinder Dialogue With the US — (2026-0701)
