We had planned to produce a weekly Franco-German press review in French and German. However, due to the interest shown, we decided instead to produce a more detailed monthly press review, with an English version. Here is our first issue.
Analysis of a Relationship in Full Redefinition (June 2025)
The report analyzes the Franco-German « new start » of June 2025, initiated by President Macron and new Chancellor Merz. This rapprochement is less the result of a shared vision than a pragmatic reaction to external pressures, such as the NATO summit and the Russian threat. Convergence was observed on defense spending, energy policy (with a détente on nuclear power), and digital innovation, often thanks to the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly. However, deep strategic divergences remain, particularly regarding European autonomy versus the transatlantic link and on issues like the Mercosur agreement. The relationship is therefore a calculated alliance, whose strength will be tested by future geopolitical and economic challenges.
European-Security — Paris, Berlin, June 30, 2025.
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Context of a Relaunch
June 2025 marked a period of intense diplomatic activity for the Franco-German couple, offering a first real-world test for the « new start » announced at the highest level. This renewal was initiated in the wake of the election of the new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, on May 6, 2025, following an unprecedented second round of voting in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, marking a conservative shift for the country.[01] As early as May 7, a meeting in Paris between President Emmanuel Macron and the new Chancellor,[02] accompanied by a joint op-ed in Le Figaro, laid the groundwork for a desire to « reset Franco-German relations. »[03] This relaunch, coming after a period of perceptible friction and tension under the previous government of Olaf Scholz,[04][05] was quickly confronted with geopolitical realities.
This analysis of June 2025 will examine the substance of this « new start » through three main axes:
- Strategic Alignment: How external pressures, notably a high-stakes NATO summit and an unpredictable American administration, catalyzed a convergence on security and defense matters.
- Economic Pragmatism: The search for compromise on contentious issues like energy and industrial policy, driven by a new economic realism.
- Institutional and Societal Dynamics: The role of formal frameworks, such as the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA), and the underlying state of relations between the two societies.
Observation of the events in June suggests that this rapprochement is not primarily the result of innate political chemistry or a shared ideological vision. Rather, it is a largely reactive and pragmatic alignment, forged by necessity in the face of considerable external pressures—an assertive Trump administration, the persistent Russian threat—and common internal challenges, such as economic competitiveness and energy security.[04][06][07] The mediatized « honeymoon » [08] appears less like a spontaneous romance than a calculated partnership to navigate a perilous geopolitical environment. The solidity of this new understanding will be measured by its ability to overcome the structural divergences that persist beneath a surface of rediscovered unity.
Chapter 1: The Security and Defense Axis: A United Front in the Face of Transatlantic Uncertainty
1.1 The NATO Summit: Strategic Convergence Under American Pressure
The preparations for the NATO summit in The Hague on June 25 dominated the diplomatic agenda, forcing Paris and Berlin to display a common front. Chancellor Merz’s general policy speech to the Bundestag on June 24 was a pivotal moment, defining the new German posture.[06][09][10][11][12] Stating that Germany is « back on the European and international stage, with strength and reliability, » he called the summit « historic » and committed his country to making the Bundeswehr « the most powerful conventional army in Europe, » thereby meeting partners’ expectations.[06][09]
This renewed defense ambition is driven by a dual motivation. Officially, it is a direct response to the Russian threat. The Chancellor insisted that the increase in spending was not to « do a favor for the United States and its president, » but was based on Germany’s « own convictions » in the face of a Russia that « endangers the security and freedom of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. »[10][13][14][15] Behind the scenes, however, this stance is also a clear attempt to appease and manage the demands of the Trump administration, which has made defense spending a barometer of allied commitment.[07][16][17] The Franco-German declaration of June 23, emphasizing « unity and solidarity » within the Alliance, served to solidify this united front ahead of the summit.[18] This coordination extended to the E3 format, with a meeting between Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on the sidelines of the summit, demonstrating a will to present a coherent European pole.[16]
However, this apparent unity on military spending masks a fundamental and unresolved philosophical divergence. For France, strengthening European defense capabilities is a cornerstone of « strategic autonomy, » aimed at reducing dependence on the United States.[05][19] For Friedrich Merz’s Germany, it is above all about consolidating the « European pillar of NATO » to ensure Washington remains engaged in the continent’s security. This difference is not semantic but strategic. Berlin’s earlier decision to acquire American F-35 fighters rather than favoring a European solution had already illustrated this tension, causing annoyance in Paris.[04][08] The war in Ukraine exacerbated this divide: while France saw it as proof of the need for greater independence, Germany strengthened its ties with Washington as the ultimate guarantor of its security.[04] The « new start » thus appears to be a pact to cooperate on the immediate need—to spend more—while postponing the fundamental debate on the ultimate goal of this build-up.
1.2 Coordination in Foreign Policy: The Middle East Case Study
The conflict in the Middle East offered another ground to test the new Franco-German coordination. On June 24, the two capitals issued a joint call for a ceasefire in Gaza.[20] President Macron called this objective an « absolute priority, » while Chancellor Merz told deputies that « the time has come » for a truce.[20]
However, an analysis of the German position reveals a complex balancing act. On the one hand, Friedrich Merz forcefully reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to Israel’s security, described as a « reason of state » (Staatsräson).[06][09][11][12] On the other hand, he toughened his tone by reserving the right to « critically question Israel’s objectives in the Gaza Strip » and calling for the humane treatment of civilians.[20] This nuance is crucial: Berlin explicitly opposed the suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, a pressure lever advocated by other European partners, demonstrating the limits of its alignment.[20] On the Iranian issue, coordination is smoother, as evidenced by the joint E3 statement (France, Germany, United Kingdom) of June 22, which urges Tehran not to further destabilize the region.[21][22][23] Chancellor Merz hammered home that « Iran must not possess any nuclear weapons, » perfectly aligning with the French position.[06][09]
The coordinated statements on the Middle East thus demonstrate effective high-level diplomacy, but they also reveal the structural limits of foreign policy convergence. When fundamental national interests and historical responsibilities, such as Germany’s « reason of state » towards Israel, are at stake, Berlin’s room for maneuver is more constrained than Paris’s. While the two partners can agree on the objective (a ceasefire), their diplomatic and economic toolboxes, as well as their willingness to use them, differ significantly. The « new start » cannot erase these fundamental national constraints.
1.3 Schengen at Forty: Between Celebration and Tension
June saw the collision of the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Schengen Agreement on June 14 and the persistent reality of temporary controls at internal borders, maintained by both France and Germany to combat irregular immigration.[24] Chancellor Merz’s statement on the social network X illustrates this tension: he celebrates a « unique » agreement that forms « the basis of our free Europe, » before immediately following up on the need for « secure external borders » and the « implementation of the new migration rules. »[24]
Faced with this political friction, a pragmatic solution has emerged from parliamentary dialogue. French and German deputies, within the framework of the FGPA, have developed a joint proposal to examine the possibility of establishing « common control mechanisms » at the border.[25][26] This initiative was designed to defuse tensions arising from Berlin’s strengthening of controls and to transform a point of contention into a cooperation project.[26]
This approach illustrates a key strategy of the renewed Franco-German relationship: the use of the FGPA’s institutional framework to devise technical and operational solutions that bypass or defuse politically sensitive national issues. By moving the debate on border management from the executive level, where it could lead to damaging confrontations, to a joint parliamentary forum, the two countries manage to institutionalize compromise. This « FGPA method » appears to be a deliberate tool for managing disagreements by turning them into technical cooperation projects.
Chapter 2: Economy and Energy: The Search for Pragmatic Compromise
2.1 The Energy Union: Nuclear Power, a Point of Friction or a Lever for Cooperation?
The dialogue on energy saw a remarkable shift in June 2025. While the previous era was marked by open conflict over the role of nuclear power, with Germany having turned its back on civil atomics in a climate of controversy,[04][27] a clear « détente » is now perceptible.[28] Without going as far as embracing the atom, Berlin is « opening the door to cooperation with France on nuclear power, »[29] likely focusing on research and future technologies rather than the existing fleet.[30]
The centerpiece of this new pragmatism is the resolution titled « Let’s move forward with energy! Franco-German impulses for a European Energy Union, » adopted by the FGPA on June 16.[25] The joint hearing of the French Minister of Industry, Marc Ferracci, and the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Katherina Reiche, during the same session, was a key moment. The two ministers debated the respective roles of nuclear and renewable energies in decarbonization, signaling a less ideological approach.[25] Mr. Ferracci’s statement that « we must support all technologies that enable decarbonization, » whether renewables or nuclear, perfectly summarizes this new spirit.[31]
This change in Germany’s stance is not an ideological conversion, but a concession dictated by acute economic realism. The pressure on German industry to ensure a stable and decarbonized energy supply has made the old dogmatic opposition to French nuclear power untenable in European negotiations. The Merz government, with its marked pro-business orientation, seems to have understood that a pragmatic compromise with France was essential to unlock reforms of the European electricity market and stabilize prices, for the benefit of its own industrial competitiveness.[25] The priority given to industrial competitiveness over green orthodoxy appears to be a defining feature of the new chancellery.
2.2 Technological Sovereignty and Competitiveness: A Shared Ambition
The ambition to strengthen European technological sovereignty is another area of strong convergence. The second major resolution adopted by the FGPA on June 16, « For the creation of a Franco-German Digital Innovation Hub, » is the most concrete manifestation of this.[25][32] This project aims to create a center of excellence dedicated to « disruptive technologies » such as artificial intelligence, sovereign cloud, quantum technologies, and next-generation cybersecurity. Its planned location on the Franco-German border is intended to stimulate cross-border ecosystems and create a common dynamic.[32]
This initiative is not starting from scratch. It is a continuation of existing cooperation in research and development, such as joint calls for projects on private 5G or AI, or the Franco-German Academy for the Industry of the Future.[33][34][35][36] It represents an acceleration and institutionalization of these efforts. This ambition is directly linked to the broader political objective, articulated by Chancellor Merz, of reducing bureaucracy and fostering the emergence of « European champions » capable of competing on the world stage.[06][08][09]
2.3 Trade Policy: A Fragile Common Front
On the trade front, Paris and Berlin present a united face against the threat of US tariffs. In his general policy statement, Chancellor Merz called for avoiding a trade war, while warning that the EU « can and will defend its interests » if necessary, a position that echoes that of Paris.[06][09][11]
However, this united facade cracks on the issue of the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur. This subject remains a deep fault line and a major point of public disagreement between the two countries.[08] It highlights the structural differences between the German economy, which is heavily export-oriented, and French agricultural interests, which are traditionally more protectionist.
Chapter 3: The Bilateral Engine: Institutions and Society
3.1 Parliamentary Dialogue: The FGPA as a Cooperation Laboratory
The plenary session of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly on June 16 established itself as the central event of the month’s bilateral cooperation, acting as a true clearinghouse and political incubator.[25][37] This session was marked by several highlights: the opening speeches by the President of the National Assembly, Yaël Braun-Pivet, calling for a « powerful Europe » backed by the Franco-German couple, and by the President of the Bundestag, Julia Klöckner, advocating for EU reform to regain citizens’ trust.[25] The election of the new co-chairs of the bureau, Brigitte Klinkert for France and Andreas Jung for Germany, symbolized this institutional renewal.[25] The adoption of the three strategic resolutions on energy, digital, and capital markets demonstrated the FGPA’s active role in shaping common policies.[25]
3.2 Civil Society and Cultural Exchanges: A Contrasting Image
Beyond institutions, societal and cultural relations present a more nuanced picture. On an institutional level, the launch of the new Franco-German Parliamentary Prize aims to encourage civil society initiatives and strengthen ties between the two peoples.[25]
On a more symbolic level, the media coverage of two sporting encounters offers an interesting metaphor for the dynamic of cooperation and rivalry that characterizes the relationship. On the one hand, during the military world judo championships organized in Germany, the French team achieved a « harvest of medals, » finishing as team world vice-champions in a spirit of healthy competition.[38] On the other hand, on the football pitches, the French U21 team was « soundly beaten » 3-0 by its German counterpart in the semi-final of the Euro-2025, with the young Mannschaft demonstrating clinical efficiency and superior tactical mastery.[39]
These contrasting sports results can serve as a metaphor for the nature of the Franco-German relationship. It is not a partnership of equals in all areas, but an association of complementary, and sometimes competing, forces. The French success in military judo, a sport of individual and collective combat, can symbolize France’s recognized strength in defense and its culture of power projection. The German victory in football, a sport where collective discipline, efficiency, and strategic patience are paramount—the team having left the ball to the French to better counter them [39]—can be seen as a symbol of Germany’s economic and industrial power, based on rigorous organization. The « new start » is therefore not about one partner adopting the other’s model, but about finding ways to make these different strengths converge towards a common European goal.
Conclusion: Assessment and Prospects of the « New Start »
The assessment of June 2025 confirms the reality of the Franco-German « new start. » It materializes in significantly increased high-level coordination and a pragmatic, depoliticized approach to problem-solving. The FGPA, in particular, has established itself as a central tool of this new method. However, this understanding seems more dictated by external constraints than by spontaneous internal harmony.
The central tension in the relationship remains unresolved: it pits the French vision of an assertive European sovereignty against the German preference for a strengthened transatlantic partnership. The events of June show that Paris and Berlin are managing to handle this tension on a daily basis, but not to resolve it fundamentally. The durability of the Macron-Merz entente will be tested by the challenges ahead, including the final negotiations on the trade dispute with the United States, the concrete implementation of joint defense projects, and the management of the next steps in the European ecological transition.
European-Security
See Also :
- Der deutsch-französische „Neustart“ (2025-0630) —
- The Franco-German « New Start » — (2025-0630) —
- Donald, Objekt europäischen Ressentiments! — (2025-0625) —
- Donald unique objet de notre ressentiment ! — (2025-0625) —
- Deutsch-französischer Presseschau vom 10. bis 16.06.2025 — (2025-0625) —
- Revue de Presse franco-allemande du 10 au 16.06.2025 — (2025-0616) —
Sources and Legends
[01] Der Spiegel (07/05/2025), ‘Merz gewinnt Stichwahl und wird neuer Bundeskanzler’, spiegel.de
[02] Le Figaro (07/05/2025), ‘Macron reçoit Merz à l’Élysée pour un « nouveau départ » franco-allemand’, lefigaro.fr
[03] Le Figaro (07/05/2025), ‘Emmanuel Macron et Friedrich Merz : remettre à plat les relations franco-allemandes pour l’Europe’, lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/emmanuel-macron-et-friedrich-merz-remettre-a-plat-les-relations-franco-allemandes-pour-l-europe-20250507
[04] Le Monde Diplomatique (June 2025), ‘France-Allemagne : les raisons d’une discorde’, monde-diplomatique.fr
[05] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (02/06/2025), ‘Die strategische Kakofonie zwischen Paris und Berlin’, faz.net
[06] Süddeutsche Zeitung (24/06/2025), ‘Merz im Bundestag: « Deutschland ist zurück »‘, sueddeutsche.de
[07] Politico Europe (20/06/2025), ‘Europe holds its breath as Trump turns up heat ahead of NATO summit’, politico.eu
[08] Die Zeit (12/06/2025), ‘Die Flitterwochen von Macron und Merz’, zeit.de
[09] Bundestag.de (24/06/2025), ‘Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz zur europäischen und internationalen Lage’, bundestag.de/mediathek
[10] Tagesschau (24/06/2025), ‘Kanzler Merz verspricht « stärkste konventionelle Armee in Europa »‘, tagesschau.de
[11] Phoenix (24/06/2025), ‘Live: Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers im Bundestag’, phoenix.de
[12] N-TV (24/06/2025), ‘Merz pocht auf deutsche Führungsrolle’, n-tv.de
[13] Euronews (19/06/2025), ‘Russian military buildup near NATO borders raises alarm in Eastern Europe’, euronews.com
[14] The Guardian (18/06/2025), ‘Baltic states call for permanent NATO garrisons to deter Russia’, theguardian.com
[15] The Wall Street Journal (21/06/2025), ‘NATO intelligence points to sustained Russian hybrid warfare campaign’, wsj.com
[16] The Financial Times (25/06/2025), ‘Macron, Merz and Starmer show united front at tense NATO summit’, ft.com
[17] The Atlantic (15/06/2025), ‘The Coming Storm: How Europe Is Preparing for a Transactional Trump’, theatlantic.com
[18] Élysée.fr (23/06/2025), ‘Déclaration conjointe de la France et de l’Allemagne en amont du sommet de l’OTAN’, elysee.fr
[19] Institut Montaigne (June 2025), ‘L’autonomie stratégique européenne : un concept à l’épreuve des faits’, institutmontaigne.org
[20] France 24 (24/06/2025), ‘Paris et Berlin appellent conjointement à un « cessez-le-feu immédiat » à Gaza’, france24.com
[21] Auswaertiges-amt.de (22/06/2025), ‘E3-Statement zur Lage im Nahen Osten’, auswaertiges-amt.de
[22] Diplomatie.gouv.fr (22/06/2025), ‘Déclaration des porte-parole des ministères des Affaires étrangères de la France, de l’Allemagne et du Royaume-Uni sur l’Iran’, diplomatie.gouv.fr
[23] GOV.UK (22/06/2025), ‘E3 statement on Iran: 22 June 2025’, gov.uk
[24] X.com (14/06/2025), Post by @Friedrich_Merz, x.com/friedrich_merz
[25] Assemblée Nationale (17/06/2025), ‘Compte rendu de la séance plénière de l’Assemblée parlementaire franco-allemande du 16 juin 2025’, assemblee-nationale.fr
[26] Les Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace (18/06/2025), ‘Contrôles à la frontière : une proposition parlementaire franco-allemande pour apaiser les tensions’, dna.fr
[27] Handelsblatt (10/06/2025), ‘Die deutsche Energiewende am Scheideweg’, handelsblatt.com
[28] Les Échos (17/06/2025), ‘Énergie : Paris et Berlin enterrent la hache de guerre nucléaire’, lesechos.fr
[29] Le Point (18/06/2025), ‘Nucléaire : comment Berlin a mis de l’eau dans son vin’, lepoint.fr
[30] Euractiv (19/06/2025), ‘Franco-German energy deal focuses on future tech, bypasses current nuclear fleet’, euractiv.com
[31] APFA (16/06/2025), ‘Transcription de l’audition de M. Marc Ferracci et Mme Katherina Reiche’, df-pv.de/fr/
[32] Bundestag.de (17/06/2025), ‘DFPV beschließt Zentrum für digitale Innovation’, bundestag.de
[33] BMBF.de (05/06/2025), ‘Deutsch-französischer Projektaufruf zu privaten 5G-Netzen für die Industrie 4.0’, bmbf.de
[34] Economie.gouv.fr (06/06/2025), ‘Lancement d’un appel à projets franco-allemand sur l’intelligence artificielle’, economie.gouv.fr
[35] Académie Franco-Allemande pour l’Industrie du Futur (press release, 10/06/2025), ‘Bilan et perspectives de nos projets collaboratifs’, academie-industrie-futur.org
[36] DFH-UFA.org (13/06/2025), ‘Die Deutsch-Französische Hochschule fördert neue Forschungskooperationen’, dfh-ufa.org
[37] La Croix (17/06/2025), ‘L’Assemblée parlementaire franco-allemande, un discret mais efficace laboratoire d’idées’, la-croix.com
[38] Ministère des Armées (20/06/2025), ‘Championnats du monde militaires de judo : moisson de médailles pour la France’, defense.gouv.fr
[39] L’Équipe (26/06/2025), ‘Sèchement battus par l’Allemagne, les Bleuets s’arrêtent en demi-finale de l’Euro Espoirs’, lequipe.fr
