Infoguerre

Russia’s FIMI operations in Africa are not fleeting campaigns but an embedded, adaptive and persistent feature of the information environment. Russia aims to reshape public perception, undermine Western influence, and advance its own long-term, geopolitical objectives on the continent. Africa has increasingly become a geopolitical battleground, and nowhere is this clearer than in the information space. Recent findings in the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats show that Russia, in particular, has significantly expanded its FIMI operations across the continent, employing a long-term, multi-layered strategy that embeds itself within the region’s information landscape. In 2022, following the EU’s suspension of state-controlled RT and Sputnik, Russia executed a strategic pivot. Not forgetting Europe, it redirected its manipulative firepower, and adapted its tactics, to deepen its influence in Africa, capitalising on regional political shifts and positioning itself as a counterforce to the West.

Check out the real reason why Russia was not invited to the Auschwitz commemoration. And no, the West has not turned ‘Nazi’. Not so long ago, on 27 January 2025, the world commemorated 80 years since the liberation of Auschwitz by the Red Army in 1945. There was no Russian delegation present at the event. Why? Because since Russia’s unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum has refused to invite the aggressor to the annual commemoration, denouncing Russia’s war against Ukraine as a ‘barbaric act. The Kremlin and its mouthpieces have, as usual, made up an explanation for Russia’s absence from the Auschwitz commemoration: Western Russophobia and historical revisionism, and the revival of Nazism in the EU and Ukraine. In fact, Moscow has been using the ‘Nazi brush’ throughout the war to smear anyone standing up to Russian imperialism. Lately, Russia has used the same tactic to belittle and ridicule the European Union in the context of negotiating peace in Ukraine.

In the murky landscape of disinformation, few narratives have proven as stubbornly persistent as the claim that NATO expansion provoked Russia into invading Ukraine. This myth, recycled and rebranded by Kremlin apologists, shifts blame for Russia’s aggression onto the West – ignoring history and facts. It’s time to call this narrative what it is: a convenient distortion designed to justify an unjustifiable war. To truly understand this war, look not at NATO’s decisions, but at Vladimir Putin’s own words. In his infamous July 2021 essay and February 2022 speech, Putin dismissed Ukrainian sovereignty and framed the country as a historical part of Russia. His motivations aren’t defensive – they’re imperial. The invasion was about reasserting control over a former Soviet republic, crushing a thriving democracy on Russia’s border, and signalling to other post-Soviet states that turning westward comes with consequences. Putin doesn’t fear NATO. He fears democracy. That’s the real threat to the Kremlin’s power.

Moldova has been used as a testing and development ground for Russian FIMI operations for a long time. We take a look at some of the more distinct features of these experiments from last year’s campaign. Last year’s combination of a presidential election and an EU referendum offered Russia an opportunity it could not afford to ignore, as we examined here and here. Russia certainly did not restrain itself when it came to funding or other resources. In the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats, we took a closer look at the role of FIMI as part of a much wider influence campaign targeting Moldova in 2024. Leading up to the election, Russia increased the intensity of its FIMI operations against Moldova. Combining existing infrastructure with newly developed assets, Russia tried to undermine the EU enlargement process and weaken support for President Maia Sandu. EUvsDiSiNFO highlight four main ingredients from the Russian FIMI cocktail. This time the Kremlin decided to be much more transparent, combining both covert and overt channels.

Navigating the professional terminology and jargon of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) can sometimes be confusing, so we have prepared a handy glossary of key terms and concepts for the FIMI galaxy. The 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats offers a wealth of insights into information manipulation operations. EUvsDiSiNFO series of deep-dive articles peeks behind the curtain and introduces a novel analytical approach to exposing FIMI. It also zeroes in on the architecture of Russian FIMI operations, using the analogy of an iceberg, to show that a large part of this manipulative architecture is hidden below the surface. The Report also zooms out to analyse the scope of the manipulative networks and the interrelationships within them, in what we call the FIMI galaxy. What is misinformation and how is it different from disin-formation? Well, for the European Union, misinfor-mation is false or misleading content that is shared without any malicious or harmful intent. Don’t be deceived !

Behind every Russian missile is a barrage of lies. Another European election targeted by the Kremlin manipulations. As Russia’s missiles continue to rain down on Ukrainian cities, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine churns out cynical cookie-cutter denials in an attempt to dismiss civilian massacres in Ukraine. Meanwhile, we are witnessing a familiar pro-Kremlin information manipulation campaign targeting upco-ming Poland’s presidential elections in May. These coordinated campaigns reveal the true nature of the Kremlin’s playbook. Russia’s ballistic missile strike on Sumy’s city centre on 13 April that killed at least 35 civilians, including two children, and wounded 117 others during Palm Sunday religious celebrations was not an isolated incident, or a mistake, but part of a deliberate pattern. As the horrific tales out of Sumy began reaching international audiences, Moscow’s propagandists immediately started to spread varied lies: that Russia had targeted a meeting of Ukrainian military commanders, a medal ceremony, or a meeting between Ukrainian and Western forces. They followed the same pattern of lies as they did after striking a restaurant in Kryvyi Rih on 5 April.

The Kremlin exports ‘Russian culture’ to expand its soft power, but under the veneer of culture it hides imperialistic exceptionalism, absorbing other cultures as Russia’s own, appropriating artists form subjugated peoples and eroding their national identity. Clichés about countries, their cultures, and their histories influence the way we see and judge the world. For that reason, soft power is globally important. Yet, history is more complex than clichés. For example, Russian culture is part of European culture. But it is also the product of an empire composed of multiple influences and talented people of many nationalities, not just Russian. The myth of the Russian soul is still strong in Western countries despite being a blurry and at times specious concept. For example, the 2009 US film Cold Souls(opens in a new tab) purported to describe how large, expressive Russian souls are different from small Western souls. In this telling, a Russian soul is pure, with an infinite capacity to suffer and experience feelings fully. But under the veneer of seeming moral depth and poetic pining, the idea of the ‘Russian soul’ also hides a facet of toxic, imperialistic exceptionalism.

Belarusian authorities are involving more children and teenagers in their propaganda activities to legitimise state policies and praise Lukashenka. Censorship, repression, and ideological indoctrination are increasingly shaping the information landscape in both Russia and Belarus. In recent months, this trend has accelerated in Belarus when it comes to ideological indoctrination and the promotion of militaristic rhetoric among Belarusian minors. The exploitation of minors for state propaganda purposes has become a recurring phenomenon.

Moscow seeks to play up the bait of potential US-Russia business relations and deflect frustration over Russia’s continued attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine. While parts of the world are focussed on tariffs and global trade, another set of events is playing out in Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is also about future prospects and deserves some attention, especially after recent talks over the past few weeks about partial ceasefires with various caveats. Let us cut through the haze and doubletalk. There was no effective ceasefire. Russia put up many conditions for accepting the US-sponsored proposal which Ukrainian President Zelenskyy had accepted. Some of Moscow’s remarks questioned when a ceasefire should come into effect while others questioned which kind of targets to exclude.

Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations rely on a vast, interconnected network – the FIMI galaxy. It is comprised of both overt and covert chancels across multiple platforms to spread, recycle, cross-promote and hide the true origins of manipulative content. Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are a complex and multi-faceted challenge which, as evidenced by Russia’s relentless FIMI operations in the context of its war against Ukraine, must be considered as a serious security issue. Therefore, the European External Action Service has endeavoured to analyse FIMI, develop a collective response, and offer a practical approach to the exposure and attribution of information manipulation operations.