Operation Spider Web: Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis of Operation Spider Web

This topical dossier, produced by the editorial team at European-Security, looks in detail at the planning, execution, impact and wider implications of this operation for modern warfare. In the absence of a conclusion, we’ll settle for a provisional conclusion supplemented by a concluding commentary!

— Paris, June 3, 2025 — With our correspondents in Geneva, Brussels, Berlin, and London — (©)

1. Operational Synthesis

Operation Pavutina, carried out on June 1, 2025, by Ukrainian intelligence services, primarily the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), marked a turning point in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. It illustrated Ukraine’s growing capacity to conduct complex asymmetric warfare operations and strike deep into Russian territory. This operation inflicted considerable material and psychological damage on Russia, calling into question its air defense posture and strategic depth.

Key successes of the operation include the successful targeting of multiple strategic Russian airbases, the destruction or damage of a substantial number of high-value Russian aircraft, and the innovative use of FPV (First-Person View) drones launched from within Russian territory.[01]

Strategically, the operation temporarily diminished Russia’s long-range strike capabilities, significantly boosted Ukrainian morale, provoked internal criticism within Russia of its security apparatus, and potentially influenced the ongoing peace negotiations. It also sheds light on the evolution of drone warfare and the vulnerability of conventional military assets to low-cost, high-impact asymmetric attacks.

This report analyzes in detail the planning, execution, impact, and broader implications of this operation for modern warfare.

II. Context and Genesis of Operation Spider Web

A. Strategic Preconditions and Motivations

Operation Spiderweb took place against a backdrop of stalled peace negotiations [03] and followed what was described as the largest Russian air and missile attack on Ukraine.[03] At the same time, Russia was making territorial gains, having recaptured about 5,000 square kilometers in Ukraine over the past year, including nearly 500 square kilometers in the month before the operation.[05] Ukraine actively sought to degrade Russia’s ability to launch devastating missile barrages against its cities and critical infrastructure.[06]

This timeline suggests a Ukrainian attempt to regain the strategic initiative, demonstrate its resilience, and impose significant costs on Russia. Such a show of force could potentially strengthen its negotiating position or disrupt Russia’s offensive momentum. The operation thus appears to be a direct response to the intensified Russian air campaign. It can be interpreted as Ukraine’s attempt to counter Russia’s conventional advantages—territorial gains, a larger missile arsenal—with highly effective and lower-cost asymmetric attacks. The use of relatively inexpensive FPV drones to inflict billions of dollars of damage to high-value strategic assets [02] illustrates a strategy aimed at imposing disproportionate costs on the adversary, a characteristic of asymmetric warfare. The success of such an operation can alter the perceived balance of power and influence enemy decision-making beyond direct material losses.

B. Allocation and Planning

The operation is primarily attributed to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).[09] Although the initial request mentions « Ukrainian military intelligence, » which typically refers to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), the vast majority of available sources credit the SBU with planning and execution. The GUR confirmed the loss of some Russian aircraft,[11] but the SBU is constantly designated as the main actor.

Planning for the operation reportedly took more than 18 months [01] and was allegedly personally overseen by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk.[06] Such lengthy and high-level planning indicates a major strategic investment and a complex intelligence effort. The GUR’s possible involvement could fall within the scope of interagency cooperation or specific roles in intelligence gathering or damage assessment. This lengthy preparation and the bold claim of an SBU operational « office » near a Russian FSB facility [06] suggest a significant level of intelligence penetration and the development of a clandestine infrastructure in Russia. The smuggling of drones and their components, their assembly, and the positioning of launch teams near multiple secure military airbases require extensive logistical and intelligence support on the ground.[01] This raises questions about the extent of Ukrainian networks in Russia and the vulnerabilities of Russian counterintelligence.

C. Operational Objectives

The objectives of Operation Spiderweb were multiple and aimed at both tangible military effects and significant psychological and strategic leverage.

The primary objectives included:

• The destruction or damage of Russian strategic bombers and support aircraft used in strikes against Ukraine.[06]
• The degradation of Russia’s long-range strike capabilities.[02]
• The infliction of significant economic and military costs.[01]
• Strengthening Ukrainian morale and weakening Russian confidence.[06]
• A demonstration of Ukraine’s ability to strike deep inside Russia, including in Siberia.[05]
• The constraint for Russia to divert resources to securing its air bases.[03]

Beyond the material damage, the selection of strategic bombers, symbols of Russian power projection, and the deep penetration of Russian territory were aimed at maximum psychological impact.

These aircraft are not just military tools; they embody the strategic reach and power of a nation.[09] Striking these assets in the heart of Russia shatters any illusion of invulnerability.[05] Reactions of Russian military bloggers – panic, anger, criticism of the leadership [02] – confirm this psychological shock, which may prove more significant than the immediate reduction in strike capabilities, affecting Russian morale, public confidence and potentially military planning.

III. Execution and Tactical Innovations

A. Drone Deployment and Launch Methods

The operation mobilized 117 FPV drones.[02]

These drones were allegedly smuggled into Russia, either in spare parts or secretly assembled on site.[01] Launches were carried out from hidden trailers, trucks, or mobile wooden containers/huts equipped with retractable roofs, positioned near the targeted airbases.[01] One report mentions the assembly of drones in a rented warehouse in Chelyabinsk.[08]

This tactic of pre-positioning and launching drones at short range circumvented the need for very long-range drones. It likely helped thwart Russian long-range air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems, thus ensuring operational surprise.[02]

The use of seemingly innocuous civilian vehicles or structures for concealment is a classic special operations technique, here adapted to drone warfare. This method of smuggling and locally launching FPV drones effectively created a « Trojan horse » scenario,[01] bypassing perimeter defenses designed for external threats and challenging the security of strategic assets located far behind the front. FPV drones, although short-range, become very effective when launched from these pre-positioned and concealed locations. This tactic transforms the vastness of Russian territory, previously a defensive advantage, into a vulnerability if internal security and counterintelligence cannot prevent such infiltration.

B. Coordination and Targeting

The attacks were coordinated across several airbases spread across different time zones,[11] with some drones remaining in flight for up to four hours.[11] An artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted thermal imaging targeting system was reportedly used to target critical aircraft components, such as fuel tanks.[11] Encrypted communication relays were also used.[11] Open-source intelligence (OSINT), such as commercial satellite imagery and transponder data aggregators, possibly supplemented by special reconnaissance and satellite imagery provided by NATO or the United States, was likely used for planning and targeting.[03]

Multi-target, multi-time zone coordination demonstrates a high level of command and control. AI-assisted targeting improves accuracy and efficiency, particularly for FPV drones. Blending OSINT with potentially more classified intelligence sources underscores a sophisticated intelligence gathering and targeting process. The use of relatively inexpensive FPV drones (around $4,000 each according to one source. Ukrainians produce 4,000 of them every day!) [08] to destroy or damage strategic assets worth millions or even billions of dollars (an A-50 costs about $500 million),[02] represents a « democratization » of the ability to achieve strategic effects. Previously, such results were the preserve of major military powers with expensive weaponry.

This cost-effectiveness ratio massively favors the attacker [04] implies that states with more limited resources, or even non-state actors with sufficient ingenuity and operational security, could potentially replicate such attacks against high-value targets.

C. Operational Audacity and Security Measures

Ukrainian President Zelensky claimed that the SBU’s operational « office » in Russia was located « right next to the FSB administration in one of the regions. »[06] Personnel involved in the operation were reportedly exfiltrated from Russia before the strikes.[02]

This claim about the SBU office, if true, constitutes a remarkable display of audacity and an element of psychological warfare, highlighting potential weaknesses in Russian counterintelligence. The exfiltration of the operators demonstrates meticulous planning to ensure the safety of personnel. The likely use of intelligence, potentially special reconnaissance, and allied intelligence support,[03] The likely use of intelligence, potentially special reconnaissance, and allied intelligence support,[03] The exfiltration of the operators demonstrates meticulous planning to ensure the safety of personnel. The likely use of intelligence, potentially special reconnaissance, and allied intelligence support,[03] and possible electromagnetic or cybernetic operations to “prepare the conditions” [03] highlights the critical, often invisible, non-kinetic elements that enable such kinetic successes. The physical act of launching drones is only the final step; identifying vulnerabilities, mapping airbases, understanding security routines, and potentially degrading local electronic warfare systems or radars require extensive intelligence. This multi-domain approach (intelligence, cyber, physical) is characteristic of modern sophisticated military operations.

IV. Targeted Assets and Damage Assessment

A. Identified Air Bases

Multiple sources confirm strikes on four to five major airbases. The table below summarizes available information on the targeted bases and the reported effects.

Table 1: Summary of Targeted Airbases and Reported Effects during Operation Spiderweb

Name of the Air Base	Oblast/Region	Main Types of Aircraft Stationed/Targeted	Ukrainian Claims (Damaged/Destroyed Aircraft)	Russian MdD response (if specific to the base)	Key Extracts from the Sources
Belaïa	Irkutsk (Siberia)	Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS	Included in the total of over 40; most distant target (over 4000 km)	Attack confirmed by regional governor10	2
Olenia	Murmansk	Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, Tu-142	Included in the total of over 40	Attack reported by Russian media, active defenses10	2
Ivanovo Severny	Ivanovo	A-50, Il-76	Included in the total of over 40; 1 A-50 destroyed	Attacks « repelled »6	2
Diaguilevo	Riazan	Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3	Included in the total of over 40	Attacks « repelled »6	2
Voskressensk	Moscow	(Unspecified)	Included in the total of over 40	(Unspecified)	10

Note: The Engels-2 (Saratov) and Morozovsk (Rostov) bases have declared a state of emergency,[10] and the Amur region was mentioned by the Russian MoD as having repelled attacks,[06] but direct hits are less systematically reported in the initial wave.

The selection of targets over vast distances, including deep into Siberia and the Arctic region, was intended to demonstrate the reach of Ukrainian capabilities and exploit perceived security gaps in the Russian hinterland. The successful strike on the Belaya airbase in Siberia,[05] more than 4,000 km from Ukraine, demonstrates an ability to project a threat well beyond anticipated areas. This forces Russia to reevaluate its entire national air defense posture and potentially overstretch its resources, as distance is no longer a sanctuary if attackers can infiltrate and launch locally.[02]

B. Aircraft Types and Numbers Assigned

Ukrainian claims indicate more than 40 to 41 aircraft destroyed or damaged,[01] which would represent 34% of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers or bomber fleet.[02]

Specific types include the Tu-95MS ‘Bear’, Tu-22M3 ‘Backfire’, and Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’ strategic bombers, as well as the A-50 ‘Mainstay’ Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Il-76 ‘Candid’ transport aircraft, and potentially Tu-142 anti-submarine warfare aircraft.[01] Some Ukrainian sources confirmed a lower threshold of at least 13 strategic bombers (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3) destroyed or damaged.[07]

Russia acknowledged the destruction of « several aircraft » but denied any human losses.[10] Although it is difficult to independently verify the exact figures, the consistency of Ukrainian claims across multiple official and media channels, supported by some visual evidence,[01] suggests significant losses for the Russian Air Force.

Targeting the A-50s is particularly critical due to their role as force multipliers and their limited numbers.02] Repeated destruction or damage to these devices [02] is a key element, as they are vital for Russian air operations, target coordination and air defense detection. Their loss significantly degrades Russian situational awareness and air command and control.

The focus on aircraft types that Russia no longer produces or is struggling to replace (Tu-95, Tu-22M3, A-50 chassis)²suggests a Ukrainian strategy aimed at long-term degradation of Russian strategic capabilities, not merely temporary attrition. This indicates a sophisticated understanding of Russian military-industrial limitations and a deliberate choice to maximize lasting strategic impact.

C. Estimated Financial Impact

Ukrainian estimates of financial damage range from $2 billion [08] to 7 billion dollars.[01]

This high assessment reflects the strategic nature and cost or difficulty of replacing the targeted aircraft, particularly types like the A-50 and strategic bombers, which Russia may find difficult to replace quickly, if at all, due to sanctions and deindustrialization in some sectors since 1991.[02]

D. Reported Damage to Naval/Nuclear Assets (Severomorsk)

Some Russian Telegram channels have published a video of an explosion that allegedly took place in Severomorsk at a Russian nuclear submarine base.[10] One source [11] mentions damage to the nuclear submarine base, which could threaten Russia’s maritime nuclear deterrent, stating that ‘the damage to the Severomorsk naval base would threaten the viability of the maritime component of the second strike capability.’ This information is currently being verified. The mayor of Severomorsk has denied any threat, but the opposite would have been surprising.[10]

This aspect is less substantiated than the strikes on air bases. The source’s claims [11] are strong but lack widespread corroboration in other documents directly linking « Spider Web » to confirmed damage at Severomorsk. If proven correct, this would represent a significant escalation and impact on Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Caution is warranted due to the denial and lack of corroboration.

V. Official Speeches and Disinformation

A. Ukrainian Demands and Presidential Statements

President Zelensky hailed the operation as an « absolutely brilliant result, » « an event for the history books, » achieved « only by Ukraine. »[05] He highlighted the use of 117 drones, the hitting of 34% of strategic cruise missile carriers, and the existence of an SBU « office » near an FSB facility.²SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk vowed to « destroy the enemy everywhere. »[06] The SBU claimed $7 billion in damages.[02]

Ukrainian communication focused on success, indigenous capability, boldness, and significant impact, clearly targeting domestic and international audiences to boost morale and project strength. President Zelensky’s relatively detailed public statements on the planning, execution, and success of the operation [06] can be interpreted as a strategic communications effort aimed at maximizing psychological impact on Russia, building international confidence in Ukrainian capabilities, and proactively countering Russian disinformation.

B. Official Russian Responses

The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) initially stated that « all terrorist attacks » against military airfields in the Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur regions had been « repelled. »[06] Authorities later acknowledged that « several aircraft » had been destroyed, but without causing any human casualties.[10] Moscow called the operation a « terrorist attack. »[04] Russian state media amplified claims that the strikes justified a nuclear response because they targeted strategic nuclear potential.[02]

The Russian response has evolved from initial denial or minimization to partial acknowledgment mixed with accusations of « terrorism » and nuclear signaling. This reflects an attempt to control the narrative, minimize perceived damage, and deter future attacks or Western support for them. The characterization of the operation as a « terrorist attack » [04] by Russia serves multiple purposes: delegitimizing Ukraine’s actions, rallying domestic support, and potentially creating a pretext for escalatory responses, including the invocation of nuclear doctrine.[02] Labeling strikes on military airbases as “terrorism” attempts to shift the narrative from legitimate military action to criminal activity, which can be used internally to justify harsher measures or externally to discourage international support for Ukraine’s right to self-defense.

Table 2: Comparison of Official Claims (Ukraine vs. Russia)

Aspect of the Operation	Ukrainian Claim (Excerpt from Source)	Russian Claim/Response (Source Excerpt)	Analyst’s Assessment of Divergence
Number of aircraft affected	More than 40-41 destroyed/damaged1; 34% of strategic cruise missile carriers2	« Several aircraft » destroyed [10]	Significant divergence; Ukrainian demands are more specific and lofty, likely to maximize impact. Russia is likely minimizing losses.
Financial damages	7 billion dollars1	Not specified by available sources	Ukraine highlights a high cost to underline its success. Russia avoids publicly quantifying the impact.
Success of the strikes	« Absolutely brilliant result »5	« All terrorist attacks… repelled » (initially) [06]	Direct contradiction. Partial visual evidence1and Russia’s subsequent acknowledgment of losses contradict the initial denial.
Nature of the operation	Legitimate, « brilliant » military operation5	« Terrorist attack » [04]	A typical wartime framing difference. Ukraine claims responsibility for military action, Russia criminalizes it.
Human losses	Not mentioned as a goal; focus on hardware	No human losses [10]	Possibly accurate on both sides if the strikes were targeted at parked aircraft and not personnel.

VI. Strategic Impact and Implications

A. On Russian Military Capabilities

The operation temporarily constrained Russia’s ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes.²Estimates of losses vary, ranging from 10-15% of strategic aviation and naval nuclear forces [11] 20% of its total air fleet,[09] or 34% of its strategic cruise missile carriers.[02] Russia will face difficulties in replacing lost aircraft, especially the A-50s and older types of bombers (Tu-95, Tu-22M3) which have not been produced since 1991.[02] This has forced Russia to consider a redistribution of its air defense systems to cover a much larger territory [03] and impacted its Mutual Assured Deterrence (MAD) doctrine and second-strike capability.[11]

The operation has thus inflicted a tangible, though perhaps temporary, blow to Russia’s strategic strike capability. The loss of irreplaceable or difficult-to-replace assets has longer-term implications. Beyond aircraft replacement, Russia will be under immense pressure to modernize physical security, air defenses, and counterintelligence measures at dozens, if not hundreds, of strategic sites previously considered « safe. » This will divert significant financial, material, and human resources from offensive operations or other priorities.[03] Implementing such measures across Russia’s vast territory and its many military sites is a colossal undertaking, creating a significant and lasting drain on resources.

B. Psychological Impact

In RussiaThe operation sparked widespread shock, panic, anger, and criticism among military bloggers and commentators. This criticism targeted the military leadership and the security services (FSB) for their incompetence and failure to protect strategic assets.[02] There have been calls for retaliation and the elimination of the SBU.[12] Some Russian commentators have even acknowledged the superiority of Ukrainian intelligence,[12] and Russian confidence was shaken.[06] Intense criticism from military bloggers [02] could exacerbate existing tensions within Russia’s power structures and security apparatus. Repeated and embarrassing security failures can erode trust in leadership and, in an authoritarian system, lead to blame games, factional infighting (e.g., MoD vs. FSB), and attempts by leaders to deflect responsibility.

In Ukraine, the operation resulted in a significant boost in morale,[06] being compared to other major successes such as the sinking of the cruiser Moskva.[13] The psychological impact in Russia appears profound, potentially eroding confidence in the military leadership and the state’s ability to provide security. For Ukraine, this is a significant propaganda victory and a morale booster.

C. Influence on Conflict Dynamics and Peace Negotiations

The operation took place on the eve of a round of peace talks in Istanbul.[06] Russia reportedly threatened to cancel the talks in response to the operation.¹⁶These talks have made little progress beyond the exchange of prisoners and remains.⁴Ukraine aimed to shape and strengthen its negotiating leverage.[19]

Although direct causality is difficult to prove, such a large-scale operation likely complicated the atmosphere of the talks. Ukraine may have intended it as a show of force to improve its negotiating position, while Russia may have used it as a pretext for intransigence or to issue threats. The lack of progress in the talks [18] was likely due to more fundamental disagreements, but the operation added an extra layer of tension. Every successful deep strike by Ukraine into Russian territory, especially against strategic assets, gradually normalizes such actions and tests Russian « red lines. » Although Russia makes threats,[02] its actual response (beyond rhetoric) will shape perceptions of these red lines. This could encourage Ukraine to continue or expand such operations, gradually changing the accepted boundaries of the conflict.

VII. International Reactions and Geopolitical Context

A. Statements by Key International Actors

To United States, a senior defense official noted that the attack represented an unprecedented level of sophistication.[04] Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling welcomed the mission, saying Ukraine « certainly has a lot of tricks up its sleeve. »[04] The White House was reportedly not notified in advance.[08]

In theEuropean Union, Ambassador to Kyiv Katarína Mathernová said that Ukraine « has its own cards to play in the war. »[16] The Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen, said the attack showed that kyiv is « successfully defending itself » and has the « right to defend itself, which sometimes includes pushing back the adversary. »[16]

Western reactions, while cautious through official government channels regarding direct approval of strikes on Russian soil, have generally acknowledged Ukraine’s resourcefulness and right to self-defense. The lack of prior notification to the United States, if true, underscores Ukrainian operational autonomy.

These generally muted or indirectly supportive reactions, despite the scale and depth of the operation, could signal growing Western tolerance — or even quiet encouragement — of more assertive Ukrainian actions against military targets inside Russia, as long as they do not directly involve Western long-range weapons in a manner that would cross declared red lines.

B. Question of Prior Notification to Allies

Sources differ on whether Ukraine informed the US administration in advance.[10] Several reports indicate that the White House was not notified.⁸Ukrainian officials claimed the operation was carried out « independently. »[08]

This is a sensitive point. Ukraine’s assertion of operational independence is understandable. The United States and other allies might prefer advance notification for deconfliction or to manage escalation risks, but may also tacitly accept Ukrainian autonomy for such actions if they align with broader strategic objectives of weakening the Russian war effort. Ukraine’s claim to have conducted the operation « independently » without notifying its allies,[08] and confirmation by the United States of the absence of prior warning,[15] serve to shield allies from direct Russian accusations of complicity and reinforce Ukraine’s agency. It also subtly reminds allies of Ukraine’s ability to act unilaterally if necessary.

VIII. Evolution of Asymmetric Warfare and Future Considerations

A. Lessons for Drone Warfare Doctrine and Special Operations

The operation has been described as a « new era in drone warfare. »,[01] a “knockdown” for the enemy, and what “the wars of the future will look like.”[19] It highlights the continued usefulness of special forces combined with new technologies [03] and demonstrates how small raiding forces can achieve disproportionate results (« relative superiority »).[03] The use of AI-enabled drones and covert deployment were key elements.[14]

This operation provides a compelling case study of the fusion of special operations principles (infiltration, surprise, precise targeting of vulnerabilities) with modern drone technology (low-cost FPV, AI, swarm potential).

It underscores the shift toward more distributed, less attributable, and highly adaptable forms of attack. Operation Spiderweb demonstrates that the ability to conduct strategic-level sabotage against a great power’s military assets is no longer the exclusive preserve of peer competitors with advanced air or missile strike power. It can be achieved through innovative uses of relatively accessible technologies and well-executed clandestine operations, potentially lowering the threshold for strategic disruption.

B. Implications for Global Air Base Defense Strategies

The operation forces Russia to strengthen security around its air bases [03] and highlights the need to rethink the defense of air bases in the era of drones, given their size, their fixed nature and their dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum.[03] There is a need for defense in depth, hardened shelters, decoys, mobile jammers and C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems) systems,[03] because « every flight line on the planet [is] a potential kill zone. »[03]

The success of insider-launched drone swarms against strategic airbases is a wake-up call for militaries worldwide. Traditional perimeter defenses focused on external, high-altitude, or long-range threats are insufficient. A new paradigm for airbase security is needed, emphasizing counter-infiltration, close-quarters defense against drones, and asset hardening. The success of the infiltration aspect of « Spider’s Web » underscores that future airbase (and critical infrastructure) defense cannot rely solely on technological counter-drone measures. It must integrate robust counterintelligence to prevent threat prepositioning and human-centric security to detect insider threats or clandestine enemy activity near sensitive sites.

C. Escalation Potential and Impact on Nuclear Deterrence Thinking

Russian military bloggers and media have called for nuclear responses, invoking strikes on strategic nuclear potential.[02] The operation undermines the Russian doctrine of Mutual Assured Deterrence (MAD).[11] The mission carries a significant risk of escalation; it is necessary to conduct war games on the « escalation ladder » and understand how unconventional attacks on nuclear facilities could change the conflict.³There is an evolution of norms against the targeting of nuclear-capable assets.[03]

Although a direct nuclear escalation remains unlikely based on this event alone,[02] the targeting of dual-capable bombers and potentially naval assets linked to the nuclear triad [11] deliberately interferes with Russia’s declared nuclear doctrines. This raises concerns about unintentional escalation if such attacks become more frequent or hit even more sensitive command/control or nuclear storage sites. Operation Spider Web exemplifies the fusion of traditional special operations know-how (covert infiltration, clandestine logistical support, surprise) with cutting-edge drone technology. Future conflicts will likely see further integration, creating hybrid threats that are difficult to categorize and counter with conventional doctrines.

IX. Conclusion

Operation Spiderweb on June 1, 2025, was a masterful demonstration of Ukrainian adaptation and innovation in the face of a conventionally superior adversary.

Strategically, « Spider’s Web » had a multifaceted effect.

International reactions, though measured, implicitly recognized Ukraine’s right to defend itself and the ingenuity of its forces. The lack of prior notification to allies, if confirmed, underscores Ukraine’s desire for operational autonomy.

Finally, « Spider’s Web » stands as a milestone in the evolution of modern warfare. It illustrates the growing power of unmanned systems, even inexpensive ones, when employed with special operations planning and execution. It forces all military powers to fundamentally reconsider their doctrines for defending critical infrastructure in the face of internal and technologically agile threats. While the risks of escalation, particularly through the targeting of assets linked to nuclear deterrence, cannot be ignored, the operation demonstrates above all that asymmetry and technological innovation can profoundly reshape the balance of power in contemporary conflicts.

The ability to replicate such operations, and the defensive response they require, will undoubtedly shape military strategies and security doctrines for years to come.

European-Security

X. Comment: Ukraine now in the big league

Beyond astonishment, Russia’s state of shock shows that it has been stunned by this masterstroke by the Ukrainian secret service. The shockwave from this ‘Operation Spider’s Web’ has not yet been fully felt.

The attack was carried out on a Sunday (1 June), the eve of negotiations in Turkey that were supposed to achieve nothing except the exchange of the bodies of thousands of fighters from both sides and the promise to meet again in the near future behind a green table.

The release of the images, with a slight delay for obvious reasons, added to the shock effect, bringing everyone back to reality. This is an excellent, if not the best, opportunity to realise that we are not prepared for the war that could break out in two or three years’ time. It is time to open our eyes to the nature and objectives of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Given that it takes at least ten years to prepare properly, we need to realise that it is time to find a leader who will be able to do what is necessary in two or three years.

In Les Échos, Olivier Buquen recounts Churchill’s stroke of genius: « In May 1940, with France invaded and the British army in disarray, Winston Churchill made a bold gamble: he appointed an industrialist and press magnate, his friend Lord Beaverbrook, to head a new Ministry of Aeronautical Production. The mission was simple: to produce aircraft quickly, in large numbers and at any cost. The result was spectacular: by August 1940 (!), England was able to field more aircraft than it was losing in combat. The Battle of Britain was won, not only in the air, but also in the factories. »[23]

An initial assessment

It is far too early to draw conclusions, any conclusions, from this exemplary action in more ways than one. But already, after four days, we can make an impressive initial assessment before drawing up a new inventory of Russian forces in two months’ time that will better reflect reality.

Hats off to the Ukrainians who, without a navy, sank the Russian flagship in the Black Sea, the Moskwa, and who, without an air force, have just deprived Russia of nearly 40% of its strategic air assets.

Incidentally, as General Michel Yakovlev pointed out on LCI, the attacks were aimed at ‘preventing any cannibalisation’ in order to meet the need for recoverable spare parts. This proves that recruitment for the Ukrainian services is not done on the Internet!

The icing on the cake, like the British, Ukrainian strategists showed their sense of humour on Sunday by sparing the decoys mixed in with the bombers in flight so as not to hit museum pieces, those dummy or engine-less aircraft that the Russians move around their strategic bases at night to give the impression during daily satellite checks that their resources are greater than they really are…

In six months’ time, we should be able to measure the changes that have taken place after this exemplary action, which proves once again that when know-how and political courage come together, even the wildest hopes are possible.

Impossible is not Ukrainian

Nevertheless, we can safely say, as Jean-Dominique Merchet did so well today in L’Opinion:

« Before our very eyes, Ukraine is changing the way war is waged. The blows struck on Sunday against Russian strategic aviation, then on Tuesday against the Crimean bridge, will go down in military history. Not only is Ukraine proving its technological mastery in aerial and naval drones, but it is also demonstrating its ability to mount special operations. It is now playing in the big leagues, alongside the British in World War II and the Israelis, who were able to blow up the pagers of Hezbollah leaders.

While the exact number of Russian aircraft destroyed or damaged and the damage caused to the bridge are unknown, the psychological – and therefore political – impact of these attacks is incomparable to their material consequences.[24] In his editorial, Jean-Dominique Merchet concludes: « The lesson that we in the West must learn remains. Before this war, our military leaders had not taken into account either the importance of mass or the military revolution brought about by small observation and attack drones. Nor had they imagined that civilian trucks could be used as bases for attacks on strategic sites or that the Russian navy could be crippled by a Ukraine without ships. Despite increased budgets, we are still stuck with what de Gaulle called ‘the army of our habits’. The war in Ukraine should have been a wake-up call for radical change. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from that.

Keep your secrets secret

This time, Ukraine struck in five regions where it had never struck before, up to 6,000 kilometres from its border with the Russian Federation. It managed to keep this a complete secret for 16 months. Here again, we see a connection with the British and Israeli models. Strategic communication is as much a part of war as secrecy. Politicians who spout meaningless soundbites all day long, heads of state who talk about everything and often say nothing, not to mention tweets that resemble the joyful flatulence emitted intermittently by Corsican donkeys between chores… Can you imagine General de Gaulle tweeting? When he spoke to the nation, it was because he had something to say. Different times, different customs, for sure!

Acknowledgements

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Françoise Thom in particular for her historical perspective and her long-standing vigilance regarding the Russian world, which we stubbornly refuse to see for what it is. ‘Damn French wishful thinking,’ Michel Anfrol would have said! Thanks to Quentin Dickinson for his knowledge of politics and contemporary European history. Thanks to Eric H. Biass for his expertise in the arms industry and strategic issues, and last but not least, thanks to Admiral Christian Girard for his insights and strategic analysis of the war in Ukraine.

Joël-François Dumont

See Also:

• « Operation Pavutina: Strategische Analyse » — (2025-0603) —
• « Operation Spider Web: Strategic Analysis » — (2025-0603) —
• « Opération Toile d’Araignée : Analyse Stratégique » — (2025-0603) —

Works cited

• [01] « Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web: Russia Suffers ‘Trojan Horse’ Moment in Massive Attack », June 2, 2025,
• [02] « Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment », June 1, 2025 | Institute …, June 2, 2025,
• [03] « Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment », June 1, 2025 | Institute …, June 2, 2025,
• [04] « Why Ukraine’s Surprise Attack Is Being Called ‘Russia’s Pearl Harbor’ » — Yahoo, June 2, 2025,
• [05] « Opération Toile d’araignée » : Kiev humilie Moscou – C dans l’air – 02.06.2025 – YouTube, June 2, 2025,
• [06] « What to know about Ukraine’s attack targeting Russian warplanes » …, June 2, 2025,
• [07] « Ukraine’s June 1 operation set to weaken Russia’s attacks,» June 2, 2025,
• [08] « Op Spider Web: Ukraine’s Boldest Drone Strike: A Deep Dive into » …, June 2, 2025,
• [09] « Ukraine’s Spider’s Web operation may have been far bigger – Espreso. Global », June 2, 2025,
• [10] « Opération Toile d’araignée » — Wikipédia, June 2, 2025,
• [11] « How Ukraine’s Drone Strike Shattered Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal » on June 1, 2025 – Jason Jay Smart (Substack) – Diplomatizzando, June 2, 2025,
• [12] « ‘Kremlin Was Brought to Its Knees’: Russians React to Ukraine’s » …, June 2, 2025,
• [13] « ‘Closer to victory’ – Operation Spiderweb gives much-needed » …, June 2, 2025,
• [14] « Operation Spider’s Web: How Ukraine targeted Russian airfield over 4000 km away with armed » -bombers/articleshow/121563683.cms
• [15] Ukraine and Russia working on new prisoner exchange, Zelensky says after Istanbul peace talks » – BBC News, June 2, 2025,
• [16] « Moscow threatens to call off talks in Istanbul in response to »…, June 2, 2025,
• [17] « Zelenskyy speaks at summit in Vilnius about results of Operation Spider’s Web carried out by Ukraine’s Security Service » – Yahoo, June 2, 2025,
• [18] « Ukraine and Russia agree to swap dead and wounded troops but report no progress toward ending war » – AP News, June 2, 2025,
• [19] « National Security News and Commentary », June 2, 2025,
• [20] « Ukraine, Russia conclude talks in Istanbul, a 1,200-for-1,200 prisoner exchange is in the works, Zelensky says » – The Kyiv Independent, June 2, 2025,
• [21] « Danish PM says Ukraine seems successful in defending itself » – Yahoo, June 2, 2025,
• [22] The Sky Victory project: Ukrainians have once again been pioneers by developing a revolutionary FPV kamikaze drone, the ‘GROMILO’, which is virtually invisible to electronic warfare (EW) systems. This innovation is revolutionising the way precision strikes are carried out, while significantly reducing the risks for operators. To avoid interception, fibre optics have been chosen as the communication system. The use of this new generation of drones is undoubtedly an operational breakthrough. 10,000 drones are reportedly being built every month… For obvious reasons, these systems are much more delicate to handle. Pilot training is also more complex in order to master this technology. Map and route planning has had to be adapted, and flight paths refined to ensure uninterrupted communication. One can imagine the procedures required to avoid entanglement with 2 kg coils covering an area of 20 km! Source: UAWire ‘Ukraine’s revolutionary “GROMILO” drones: harnessing fibre-optic technology to transform warfare‘, 22 January 2025’.
• [23] « Quand l’Ukraine nous donne des leçons militaires » in L’Opinion du 5 juin 2025.
• [24] « Réarmement : « Reprenons la méthode Churchill et Beaverbrook de 1940 ! » : La guerre n’est plus une simple hypothèse. La France doit passer de la théorie à la pratique, de l’illusion de la paix à l’économie de guerre, en imitant le sursaut économique provoqué par Winston Churchill et Lord Beaverbrook en 1940.» in Les Échos du 21 mai 2025.