From centuries of hostility to a foundational alliance, the history of Franco-German relations is a European saga. This article, the second in a series on the Franco-German relationship, traces the transformation of two « hereditary enemies » into pillars of the European Union.
It all begins with the Prussian humiliation by Napoleon, which sowed the seeds of a vengeful German nationalism. The 19th and first half of the 20th centuries were marked by incessant conflicts. The War of 1870, World War I, and the « diktat » of Versailles fueled a cycle of hatred. World War II was the culmination of this spiral of destruction and antagonism. Yet, after 1945, visonaries like de GHaulle and Adenauer chose reconciliation
Of course, here is the American English translation of the text you provided.
From centuries of hostility to a foundational alliance, the history of Franco-German relations is a European saga. This article, the second in a series on the Franco-German relationship, traces the transformation of two « hereditary enemies » into pillars of the European Union.
It all begins with the Prussian humiliation by Napoleon, which sowed the seeds of a vengeful German nationalism. The 19th and first half of the 20th centuries were marked by incessant conflicts. The War of 1870, World War I, and the « diktat » of Versailles fueled a cycle of hatred. World War II was the culmination of this spiral of destruction and antagonism. Yet, after 1945, visionaries like de Gaulle and Adenauer chose reconciliation.
Signing of the Élysée Treaty by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer— Photo
The 1962 speech to German youth and the 1963 Élysée Treaty sealed this new friendship. Concrete projects like the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO), ARTE, and the Franco-German Brigade strengthen this bond.
The 2019 Treaty of Aachen further solidified this unique global cooperation. This dramatic transformation, from deep animosity to a solid alliance, offers a lesson of hope for international relations. It is the story of political will capable of overcoming the wounds of the past—an example of resilience and of building a common future on the ashes of division.
Introduction: The Franco-German Couple – From « Hereditary Enemy » to the Engine of Europe
The relationship between France and Germany, nations at the heart of Europe, constitutes a historical fabric of singular complexity and richness. For centuries, their destinies have been intertwined in a frequently confrontational dialectic, marked by devastating wars, mutual humiliations, and antagonisms deeply rooted in the collective consciousness.
Throughout this series of articles, our approach aims to analyze this tumultuous relationship, to describe its evolution, to seek to understand the drivers of German attitudes without justifying them, and finally, to draw lessons from a history that, after reaching the depths of confrontation, managed to steer toward an exemplary reconciliation, making the Franco-German couple an essential engine of European integration.
Table of Contents
by Joël-François Dumont — Berlin, September 26, 2025
The concept of the « hereditary enemy » (Erbfeindschaft) long served to characterize the mutual perception between France and the German political entities, and later, a unified Germany.
This notion, far from being an immutable fate, proved to be an ideological and political construct, fueled by repeated conflicts and the exacerbation of nationalism. The initial query rightly pointed out that some have « improperly described as hereditary » these enmities.
Recent political stances, particularly around the 2019 Treaty of Aachen, confirm that this concept « belongs to the past » and that the ambition is now to ensure that it « will never again be part of our vocabulary, » or even to replace it with that of « hereditary friend. » This radical transformation, from a centuries-old hostility to a structuring partnership, is an exceptional case study in the annals of international relations. It should be noted, for factual accuracy, that the Battle of Austerlitz, often cited as an early milestone in this antagonism with Prussia, took place on December 2, 1805, not in 1802.
The following analysis will seek to demonstrate that the Franco-German relationship, though marked by cycles of conflict and humiliation, was able to undergo a profound metamorphosis thanks to a visionary political will and a shared awareness of the traumas of the past. This unique trajectory offers valuable lessons for understanding contemporary international dynamics.
Table 1: Chronology of Franco-German Conflicts and Reconciliation
| Date(s) | Événement Majeur | Acteurs Clés (France/Prusse/Allemagne) | Résultat/Conséquence Immédiate pour les Relations Franco-Allemandes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1805 | Bataille d’Austerlitz | Napoléon Ier, François II (Autriche), Alexandre Ier (Russie) | Victoire française ; impact indirect sur la Prusse par la suite. |
| 1806 | Batailles d’Iéna et d’Auerstedt | Napoléon Ier, Frédéric-Guillaume III (Prusse) | Défaite écrasante de la Prusse, occupation française, humiliation prussienne. |
| 1807 | Traité de Tilsit | Napoléon Ier, Frédéric-Guillaume III (Prusse) | Démembrement partiel et sévères conditions imposées à la Prusse. |
| 1870-1871 | Guerre Franco-Prussienne | Napoléon III, Otto von Bismarck | Défaite française, unification allemande, annexion de l’Alsace-Lorraine par l’Allemagne. |
| 1914-1918 | Première Guerre Mondiale | France, Allemagne (Empire Allemand) | Défaite allemande, fin des empires centraux. |
| 1919 | Traité de Versailles | Alliés, Allemagne (République de Weimar) | Conditions très dures pour l’Allemagne (territoriales, militaires, financières, culpabilité). |
| 1939-1945 | Seconde Guerre Mondiale | France, Allemagne (Troisième Reich) | Défaite allemande, occupation de la France puis libération, division de l’Allemagne. |
| 1962 | Discours de Ludwigsburg | Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer | Geste symbolique majeur de réconciliation, appel à la jeunesse. |
| 1963 | Traité de l’Élysée | Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer | Coopération bilatérale institutionnalisée, fondation du partenariat moderne. |
| 2019 | Traité d’Aix-la-Chapelle | Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel | Approfondissement de la coopération, réponse aux défis contemporains. |
1. The Napoleonic Era: Prussian Humiliation and the Emergence of German National Sentiment
The Franco-Prussian antagonism, which would long mark the relations between the two nations, has deep roots in the Napoleonic era. While France had already had disputes with Austria, the confrontation with Prussia from 1806 onward would take a particularly acrimonious turn, leaving deep and lasting scars.
The Battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) and its Immediate Aftermath
Napoleon I’s brilliant victory at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, in the « Battle of the Three Emperors, » marked a major turning point in the balance of power in Europe. While the French Emperor showed some magnanimity towards defeated Austria and Russia, his attitude towards Prussia, which was not directly involved in this battle but would soon challenge French power, was of a very different nature. This difference in treatment already foreshadowed the tensions to come and contributed to shaping distinct perceptions within the Germanic territories.
The Prussian Defeats at Jena and Auerstedt (October 14, 1806)
Prussia, which then considered itself to have the first army in Europe, suffered an unprecedented military disaster at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt on October 14, 1806. The Prussian army was literally annihilated by Napoleonic troops. Napoleon had hoped for a lasting peace, but a Prussian ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of French troops beyond the Rhine, forced him to act. The French response was devastating. Prussian losses were considerable, including 10,000 dead and wounded, 3,000 prisoners, and 115 cannons at Auerstedt alone, where Marshal Davout, against Napoleon’s predictions, confronted and defeated the bulk of the Prussian army. These defeats were not only military; they constituted a deep psychological shock, a national humiliation for a state whose identity and pride rested largely on its military tradition and effectiveness. Queen Louise of Prussia, an emblematic and beloved figure, is said to have died of grief as a result of these events, becoming a symbol of the nation’s martyrdom. This initial trauma fueled a virulent anti-French sentiment and a desire for revenge that would simmer for decades.
The Treaty of Tilsit (July 1807) and its Devastating Consequences for Prussia
The Prussian humiliation was sealed by the Treaty of Tilsit, signed in July 1807 between Napoleon, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, and King Frederick William III of Prussia. The conditions imposed on Prussia were extremely harsh. The kingdom lost nearly half of its territory and population (about 5 million inhabitants), as well as almost all of its fortresses. A crushing war indemnity, amounting to between 120 and 140 million francs, was imposed on it, and its army was reduced to a contingent of 42,000 men. Furthermore, Prussia was forced to join the Continental Blockade against England. The personal treatment inflicted by Napoleon on King Frederick William III, described as contemptuous and distant, contrasted with the regard shown to the Russian Tsar, which only accentuated the feeling of debasement. The clauses of the treaty, such as the cession of vast territories to form the Kingdom of Westphalia under the authority of Jérôme Napoleon, were clearly aimed at dismantling Prussian power and neutralizing it for years to come. Far from ensuring a lasting peace, these draconian conditions sowed the seeds of a tenacious resentment and a will for national restoration. Prussia, humiliated and dismembered, henceforth aspired only to regain its sovereignty and to avenge the affront.
The Intellectual and Cultural Response: The Awakening of German Nationalism
In the face of French occupation and national humiliation, a profound intellectual and cultural reaction took place in the German territories, particularly in Prussia. This period was a true crucible for the emergence of a modern German national sentiment. Leading intellectual figures played a decisive role in this awakening. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, with his « Addresses to the German Nation » (Reden an die deutsche Nation), delivered in Berlin under French occupation during the winter of 1807-1808, is emblematic of this movement. Initially favorable to the ideals of the French Revolution, Fichte, like many of his contemporaries, saw Napoleon as the gravedigger of these ideals and the embodiment of a new tyranny.
His speeches were a vibrant call for the moral, cultural, and political regeneration of the German people. Fichte exalted the German language and culture, considering them the foundations of a common identity and a specific, even superior, mission in the history of humanity. He defined the German nation not on political and social bases, as was the case in France with the idea of citizenship derived from the Revolution, but on cultural and ethnic criteria: a common language, a shared origin and past, a geographical « area » where this culture had flourished. This vision made it possible to transcend the existing political divisions among the many German states. The goal was to transform military defeat and political humiliation into a catalyst for national unity and the awareness of a unique destiny. By positing the « German Self » as a primary reality capable of engendering universality, and by presenting the German people as a « primitive people » who had retained a direct link to the original sources, Fichte provided a powerful ideological foundation for cultural and, potentially, political resistance.
Thus, Napoleonic domination, by the brutality of its manifestation and the humiliation inflicted, particularly on Prussia, had a paradoxical effect: it accelerated the emergence of a German nationalism that would, in time, seek to assert itself against France. The defeats of Jena and Auerstedt were not just military setbacks; they became painful places of memory, symbols of national shame that would later be invoked to justify other conflicts, in a fatal logic of revenge.
2. From 1815 to 1871: The Rise of Tensions and German Unification by Iron and Blood
The fall of Napoleon in 1815 and the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe, but did not end German national aspirations or Prussian resentment. The period up to 1871 was marked by a gradual rise in tensions, the assertion of Prussia as the dominant power within the German Confederation, and finally, the unification of Germany under its leadership, often at the expense of France.
The Post-Napoleonic Context and the Restoration
After 1815, Prussia recovered some of its lost territories and gained influence. However, the humiliation suffered under Napoleon had left deep scars. The desire for German unity, driven by liberal and nationalist currents, clashed with the political division of the German Confederation and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria. Prussian attempts to take the initiative, as mentioned in the query for the years 1830 and 1848 (during the « Spring of Nations »), testified to a persistent ambition, but the conditions were not yet ripe to unify Germany by Prussian will alone.
The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871)
The rise to power of Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor of Prussia in 1862 radically changed the situation. A proponent of an unscrupulous « Realpolitik, » Bismarck was determined to achieve German unity around Prussia, by « iron and blood » rather than by speeches and majority votes. His strategy consisted of diplomatically isolating his adversaries and provoking conflicts that he judged favorable to Prussian interests.
The causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 are complex, but the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the Spanish throne served as a pretext for Bismarck. Through a skillful manipulation of the « Ems Dispatch, » he exacerbated tensions and pushed Napoleon III’s France, already worried about Prussia’s rising power, to declare war on July 19, 1870. In doing so, Bismarck succeeded in making France appear as the aggressor, which helped to rally the southern German states, initially wary of Prussia, to the common cause.
The war was a succession of disasters for France. The superiority of Prussian military organization, the quality of its artillery, and the strategy of its generals led to rapid victories. The Battle of Sedan on September 1, 1870, was particularly decisive: a large part of the French army was surrounded and forced to surrender, and Emperor Napoleon III himself was taken prisoner. This defeat marked a « seismic shift in European power. » The proclamation of the German Empire on January 18, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles—a highly symbolic place of the French monarchy—completed the humiliation of France. This act was perceived as a « humiliating ceremony for France, » reversing the balance of power that had prevailed during the Napoleonic Wars. The phrase attributed to Bismarck, « There was Sedan because there was Auerstedt, » cited in the query, perfectly illustrates this logic of historical revenge, where the victory of 1870 was seen as the response to the defeat of 1806.
The Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871)
The Treaty of Frankfurt, signed on May 10, 1871, formalized the German victory and imposed very harsh conditions on France. The most painful was the cession of Alsace (with the exception of Belfort) and part of Lorraine (corresponding to the current department of Moselle) to the new German Empire. These territories were established as the « Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen, » administered directly from Berlin. In addition, France had to pay a colossal war indemnity of five billion gold francs, and part of its territory remained occupied until this sum was paid in full.
The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was experienced in France as an amputation, a deep national wound, and a flagrant injustice. As the query emphasizes, « France was amputated of Alsace-Lorraine and would live only to avenge this affront. » This feeling of loss and this desire for « revenge » would long mark French politics and Franco-German relations, creating « lasting symbolic damage. » The recovery of the « lost provinces » became a leitmotif of the Third Republic and one of the deep-seated causes of the tensions that led to World War I. The annexation, although representing a strategic and economic gain for Germany, proved to be a perennial source of instability, ensuring tenacious French hostility.
The period from 1815 to 1871 thus saw Prussia take its revenge on France, unifying Germany under its authority and in turn inflicting a national humiliation on its neighbor. The cycle of affronts and reprisals seemed to have been reversed, preparing the ground for new confrontations. While Bismarck’s objectives in 1870 were mainly focused on German unification, the consequences of his victory, particularly the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, went far beyond, entrenching an enmity that would define Franco-German relations for the next fifty years.
3. World War I and the Treaty of Versailles: A Perpetual Cycle of Humiliation
The German victory of 1871 and the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles had profoundly altered the balance of power in Europe, leaving France humiliated and eager for revenge, and Germany in the position of the new dominant power on the continent. The following decades were marked by rising tensions, arms races, and the formation of rival alliances, which would ultimately lead to World War I. This conflict, and the treaty that ended it, would in turn inflict a deep humiliation on Germany, thus perpetuating the destructive cycle.
World War I (1914-1918) as a Continuation
World War I, which began in August 1914, can be analyzed, as the query suggests, as a continuation and escalation of the Franco-German conflict of 1870. The question of Alsace-Lorraine remained an open wound for France, fueling a revanchist nationalism. In Germany, Pan-Germanism and imperial ambitions contributed to a climate of confrontation. Successive international crises (particularly in Morocco) and the rigidity of the alliance systems (Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente) made the conflagration almost inevitable.
The Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919): The German « Diktat »
After four years of a horrifically deadly war, Germany and its allies were defeated. The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919—the anniversary of the assassination in Sarajevo that had served as the trigger for the conflict—was drawn up by the victorious powers, mainly France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, without any real German participation in the negotiations. For Germany, this treaty was immediately perceived as a « Diktat, » an imposed and punitive peace. The query emphasizes that « everything will be done to humiliate Germany again, » and the terms of the treaty seemed to confirm this intention, at least from the German point of view. Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, whose country had suffered the most from the German invasion, demanded an « unconditional signature » and sought to permanently weaken Germany to ensure France’s security.
The clauses of the treaty were particularly severe:
- Territorial Clauses: Germany had to return Alsace-Lorraine to France. It also lost significant territories to Poland (notably the « Danzig Corridor » which separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, and part of Upper Silesia), Belgium (Eupen and Malmedy), and Denmark (North Schleswig). Danzig became a free city under the administration of the League of Nations. The Saar Basin, rich in coal, was placed under international administration for fifteen years, its mines being exploited for the benefit of France. All German colonies were confiscated and divided among the victors. In total, Germany lost about 15% of its European territory and 10% of its population. « Buffer » states like Poland and Czechoslovakia were declared independent.
- Military Clauses: The German army was reduced to 100,000 men, with no compulsory military service, no air force, no tanks, and no submarines. Its surface fleet was drastically limited. The Rhineland, the border region with France and Belgium, was demilitarized. Germany had to hand over a large part of its existing weaponry.
- Economic and Financial Clauses: Article 231 of the treaty, the famous « war guilt clause, » declared Germany and its allies responsible for starting the war. On this basis, colossal war reparations were demanded (estimated in 1921 at 132 billion gold marks). Germany also lost ownership of its industrial patents (Bayer’s aspirin falling into the public domain is a famous example) and had to renounce its customs conventions, accepting restrictions on its imports and exports.
The German perception of this treaty was unanimously negative. The President of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert, welcomed the German soldiers returning from the front by declaring that « no enemy has defeated you, » fueling the myth of the « stab in the back » (Dolchstoßlegende), according to which the German army had not been defeated militarily but betrayed by civilians and revolutionaries at home. This perception of an unjust and humiliating peace, imposed by force, undermined the legitimacy of the young Weimar Republic from the outset.
Socio-Economic and Political Consequences in Germany
The consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany were profound and long-lasting. The burden of reparations, combined with territorial and industrial losses, strangled the German economy and contributed to devastating hyperinflation in the early 1920s. Although payment adjustment plans (like the Dawes Plan in 1924) brought temporary relief, resentment persisted. The global economic crisis of 1929 hit Germany hard, exacerbating unemployment and social misery.
This breeding ground of economic difficulties, political instability, and national humiliation was extremely fertile for nationalist and extremist movements. As the query points out, this led to « profound upheavals » in the country and multiplied « coup attempts. » Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) knew how to exploit this popular resentment with formidable effectiveness, promising to tear up the « Diktat of Versailles, » restore Germany’s greatness, and give it back its pride. The signing of the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the very place where the German Empire was proclaimed in 1871, was perceived as a deliberate symbolic humiliation, reversing that of 1871 but inflicting a new wound on German national pride. This symbolic dimension, coupled with the guilt clause, transformed the treaty into a source of national shame, making its acceptance by the German population almost impossible and providing powerful propaganda for those who sought its overthrow.
Thus, the Treaty of Versailles, by seeking to punish Germany and guarantee the security of the Allies, particularly France, through excessively harsh and humiliating measures, failed to achieve its goal of establishing a lasting peace. On the contrary, it created the conditions for its own failure by fueling a deep desire for revenge in Germany, unintentionally paving the way for a new catastrophe. The cycle of humiliations, far from being broken, seemed to have simply been reversed once more.
Table 2: Comparative Table of Key Treaties
| Traité (Année) | Contexte Historique Majeur | Principales Clauses pour la Prusse/Allemagne | Principales Clauses/Impact pour la France | Impact Global sur les Relations Franco-Allemandes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traité de Tilsit (1807) | Défaite prussienne (Iéna-Auerstedt), hégémonie napoléonienne. | Perte de ~50% du territoire, armée réduite à 42 000 hommes, lourdes indemnités, adhésion au Blocus continental. | Consolidation de la domination napoléonienne en Europe centrale. | Profonde humiliation prussienne, ressentiment anti-français, catalyseur du nationalisme allemand naissant. |
| Traité de Francfort (1871) | Défaite française (Sedan), unification allemande sous la Prusse. | Gain de l’Alsace (moins Belfort) et d’une partie de la Lorraine (Moselle), indemnité de guerre de 5 milliards de francs-or. | Perte de l’Alsace-Lorraine, paiement d’une lourde indemnité, humiliation nationale. | Antagonisme franco-allemand exacerbé, désir de « revanche » en France, consolidation du concept d’« ennemi héréditaire ». |
| Traité de Versailles (1919) | Défaite allemande (Première Guerre Mondiale). | Pertes territoriales significatives (Alsace-Lorraine, territoires à l’Est, colonies), clause de culpabilité (Art. 231), réparations massives, armée limitée à 100 000 hommes, démilitarisation de la Rhénanie. | Récupération de l’Alsace-Lorraine, réparations (partielles), garantie de sécurité (temporaire). | Perçu comme un « Diktat » en Allemagne, instabilité de la République de Weimar, ressentiment profond, terreau pour l’extrémisme et la revanche. |
| Traité de l’Élysée (1963) | Après-Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Guerre Froide, volonté de réconciliation. | Pour la RFA et la France : Coopération bilatérale institutionnalisée dans les domaines politique, défense, éducation, jeunesse. | Pour la France et la RFA : Cadre pour une nouvelle relation basée sur la confiance et des objectifs communs. | Rupture avec le cycle des conflits, fondation du partenariat franco-allemand moderne, moteur de la construction européenne. |
4. The Interwar Period and World War II: The Climax of the Conflict
The interwar period was a time of chronic instability in Europe, particularly in Germany, where the after-effects of the Treaty of Versailles and economic crises created a climate conducive to the rise of extremism. World War II, initiated by Nazi Germany, marked the peak of violence and destruction in Franco-German relations, before a radical transformation began.
The Crisis of 1929 and the Rise of Hitler
The Weimar Republic, already weakened by putsch attempts and hyperinflation, was hit hard by the Great Depression that began in 1929. The global economic crisis significantly worsened unemployment and social misery in Germany, undermining confidence in democratic institutions. As the query mentions, the 1929 crisis « amplified the situation, multiplying coup attempts until Hitler came to power. » Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist Party (NSDAP) knew how to exploit this despair. Their propaganda, focused on rejecting the « Diktat of Versailles, » the promise to restore Germany’s greatness, the designation of scapegoats (especially Jews and communists), and an exacerbated nationalism, found a growing echo among the population. The NSDAP, which obtained only 2% of the vote in 1928, saw its score climb dramatically to 18% in 1930, then 38% in 1932, becoming the largest party in Germany. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor. It is important to note that while resentment related to Versailles was a factor, the economic crisis and the support of certain conservative and industrial elites, who thought they could control Hitler, were also decisive in his rise to power.
Revanchist Rhetoric and Remilitarization
Once in power, Hitler methodically set about dismantling the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, which he considered an intolerable injustice and an obstacle to the rebirth of German power. He reinstated compulsory military service, launched a massive rearmament program, and in 1936, remilitarized the Rhineland, in flagrant violation of the treaty. These actions were carried out in the name of restoring national honor and Germany’s right to self-determination, finding broad popular support. The expansionist policy of the Third Reich then manifested itself in the annexation of Austria (Anschluss) in March 1938, then the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in September 1938, always in violation of existing treaties. The concept of « living space » (Lebensraum), already discussed in Germany before Hitler, became a central dogma of Nazi ideology, justifying a policy of aggression and conquest in the East. German nationalism, which may have had cultural roots and a legitimate desire for dignity, was thus perverted by Nazi ideology into a doctrine of racial superiority and brutal expansionism.
World War II and the Symbolism of Sedan (1940)
Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, triggered World War II. In the spring of 1940, the German army launched its offensive in the West, using « Blitzkrieg » (lightning war) tactics that quickly overwhelmed the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and then France. The German breakthrough through the Ardennes and the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan in May 1940 were of capital strategic and symbolic importance. This German victory at Sedan, where French forces were overwhelmed and routed, was a reversed and aggravated repetition of the French defeat of 1870. The user’s query mentions that Hitler himself went to Sedan and would have pronounced the same sentence as Bismarck after 1870 (« there was Sedan because there was Auerstedt »), emphasizing the persistence of this memory of affronts and the desire to mark a definitive revenge. This deliberate act of referring to historical places and words demonstrates a conscious manipulation of collective memory for political and psychological warfare purposes, aiming to consecrate the 1940 victory as the culmination of a long cycle of revenges and the final reversal of past humiliations, including that of Versailles.
Occupation and Collaboration
The rapid defeat of France in June 1940 was a national trauma. The country was divided, with a zone occupied by Germany in the north and on the Atlantic coast, and a « free zone » in the south, led by Marshal Pétain’s Vichy regime, which engaged in a policy of collaboration with the Nazi occupier. This period of occupation, deprivation, repression, and collaboration marked the lowest point of French sovereignty and a particularly dark chapter in Franco-German relations, characterized by domination and oppression.
World War II thus brought the Franco-German antagonism to its peak. The boundless ambitions and criminal ideology of the Nazi regime dragged Europe and the world into an unprecedented catastrophe. For France, the defeat of 1940 and the occupation were a profound humiliation, while for Germany, the war ended in total defeat, massive destruction, the revelation of the horror of the Holocaust, and the division of the country. It was on these ruins and this field of moral desolation that, against all odds, a process of reconciliation was to begin.
5. Franco-German Reconciliation: A Visionary Political Will
The end of World War II in 1945 left Europe in ruins, Germany defeated, divided, and morally discredited, and France, although among the victors, deeply wounded and weakened. The context of the nascent Cold War, with the division of the world into two antagonistic blocs, would however create a new imperative: the need for cooperation in Western Europe to face the Soviet threat. It is in this framework, and thanks to the exceptional vision and courage of a few statesmen, that a historic reversal took place: Franco-German reconciliation.
The Post-War Context: Ruins and Division
Germany, in particular, emerged from the conflict exhausted. Its cities were destroyed, its territory occupied by the four Allied powers (United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union), and soon divided into two distinct states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East. The awareness of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, especially the Holocaust, placed Germany under a heavy moral and historical burden.
The Pivotal Role of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer
At the heart of this improbable reconciliation are two major figures: General Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite the overwhelming weight of history, the suffering endured by their respective peoples, and the accumulated resentments, these two statesmen had the lucidity and political will to transcend past antagonisms to build a common future.
General de Gaulle’s position towards Germany had evolved considerably. Immediately after the war, he advocated a hardline policy aimed at permanently weakening Germany and ensuring France’s security, even considering a dismemberment or internationalization of certain German regions. However, faced with the rising Soviet threat and the division of Europe, his strategic vision changed. He understood that a free, democratic West Germany, firmly anchored in the Western camp, in close partnership with France, was essential for the security of the continent.
For his part, Konrad Adenauer, deeply marked by the catastrophes of the 20th century, made it his absolute priority to anchor the young FRG in the concert of Western democratic nations. He saw reconciliation with France as the cornerstone of this policy, essential for Germany’s reintegration, its moral and political reconstruction, and the building of a peaceful and united Europe.
The personal relationship of trust and mutual esteem that developed between de Gaulle and Adenauer was a decisive factor. Their first meeting in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, the General’s private residence, in September 1958, laid the foundations for this understanding. Adenauer, initially wary of what he perceived as de Gaulle’s nationalism, was reassured by the French president’s European vision and his understanding of the Soviet danger.
Several strong symbolic gestures marked this rapprochement, helping to change perceptions in the public opinion of both countries:
- Konrad Adenauer’s official visit to France in July 1962, which culminated in a joint mass with General de Gaulle at Reims Cathedral. This place, where many French kings were crowned and which had been bombed by German artillery during World War I, became the symbol of reconciliation.
- General de Gaulle’s triumphant tour of Germany in September 1962. Everywhere he went, he was acclaimed. His speech to the German youth in Ludwigsburg, delivered largely in German, had a considerable impact. By congratulating the young Germans on being « the children of a great people, » while acknowledging the « great faults » and the « great reprehensible and condemned misfortunes » that this people had committed throughout its history, he struck a sensitive chord and opened the way to a shared future.
These acts of public diplomacy, charged with emotion and symbolism, were essential to prepare minds for a radical paradigm shift in bilateral relations. They demonstrated a political will that went beyond strategic calculations, touching on a moral and human dimension of reconciliation.
The Élysée Treaty (January 22, 1963): The Cornerstone of Cooperation
Six months after the Ludwigsburg speech, on January 22, 1963, General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer signed the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation in Paris, better known as the Élysée Treaty. This treaty not only officially sealed the reconciliation; it established an ambitious and detailed framework for close and lasting cooperation between the two countries. It marked, as the Élysée website points out, the consolidation of the driving role of the Franco-German couple in European integration.
Plaque in memory of De Gaulle and Adenauer in front of the KAS in Berlin — Photo © Joël-François Dumont
The objectives of the treaty were multiple and covered essential areas:
- Regular Consultations: The treaty established mandatory and frequent meetings at all levels of government: heads of state and government (at least twice a year), ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, National Education, and Youth (at least every three or two months depending on the case), and chiefs of staff.
- Foreign Policy: The two governments undertook to consult each other before any decision on all important foreign policy issues, with a view to reaching, as far as possible, a similar position.
- Defense: A rapprochement of strategic and tactical doctrines was aimed for, with the planned creation of Franco-German operational research institutes and personnel exchanges.
- Education and Youth: Particular attention was paid to this area, recognized as essential for the future of cooperation. This included efforts to increase the teaching of the partner’s language in each country, the acceleration of diploma equivalences, and cooperation in scientific research. Above all, the treaty provided for the creation of an organization to develop youth exchanges, the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO).
- Economic Cooperation: The treaty encouraged the joint study of ways to strengthen cooperation in important sectors such as agricultural policy, energy, communications, and industrial development, within the framework of the Common Market.
The importance of the Élysée Treaty lies in its innovative character: it was not a simple non-aggression pact or a classic military alliance, but a true project of deep integration of societies and state apparatuses. By institutionalizing dialogue and consultation at all levels, it aimed to create reflexes of cooperation, a culture of mutual understanding, and an interdependence that would make any return to hostility not only undesirable but structurally difficult. The primacy given to youth and education testified to a long-term vision, seeking to root reconciliation in the hearts and minds of future generations.
6. The Fruits of Cooperation: Concrete Initiatives and a Living Partnership
The Élysée Treaty of 1963 was not a mere declaration of intent; it laid the groundwork for an exceptionally dense and multifaceted Franco-German cooperation, which has resulted in a multitude of concrete initiatives and the creation of institutions that have become emblematic of this unique partnership. These achievements have touched on areas as varied as youth, culture, defense, the economy, and cross-border cooperation, weaving a network of close ties between the two societies.
Youth: The Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO / DFJW)
One of the most significant and lasting creations of the Élysée Treaty is undoubtedly the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO, or Deutsch-Französisches Jugendwerk – DFJW). Its mission, from the outset, has been to tighten the links between young French and Germans, to strengthen their mutual understanding, to promote intercultural learning, and to awaken their interest in the language and culture of the partner country. Since its creation in 1963, the FGYO has enabled nearly 9.5 million young people to participate in more than 382,000 exchange programs. It supports an average of 8,000 to 9,000 encounters each year, whether school or university exchanges, town twinnings, sports or cultural meetings, internships, or associative projects. With an annual budget of about 30 million euros in 2019, financed equally by the French and German governments, the FGYO has played an irreplaceable role in changing mindsets. By allowing generations of young people to discover the neighboring country, to form friendships, and to overcome stereotypes inherited from the past, it has profoundly contributed to rooting reconciliation in the lived experience of citizens. The emphasis on youth from 1963 testifies to a long-term strategic vision: investing in future generations to guarantee the permanence of peace and friendship.
Culture: The ARTE Television Channel and Other Initiatives
Cultural cooperation has also been a pillar of Franco-German relations. The most emblematic example is the television channel ARTE (Association Relative à la Télévision Européenne). Created by an interstate treaty signed on October 2, 1990, on the eve of German Reunification, it began broadcasting on May 30, 1992. ARTE is a Franco-German cultural channel with a European vocation, offering quality programs (documentaries, fiction, live performances, magazines) in both languages, and increasingly in other European languages, thus reaching 70% of Europeans in their mother tongue. Its headquarters, symbolically located in Strasbourg, a border city and symbol of European reconciliation, is complemented by important hubs in Paris (ARTE France) and Baden-Baden (ARTE Deutschland). ARTE’s mission is to promote understanding and rapprochement between peoples in Europe through a demanding and innovative cultural offering. Beyond ARTE, cultural cooperation has manifested itself through the co-location of French and German cultural institutes abroad, the creation of common digital platforms for young people (like ARTE’s European Collection or the ENTR project), and joint strategies for promoting the partner’s language. These initiatives aim to create a shared cultural space and foster better mutual knowledge.
Defense: The Franco-German Brigade and Strategic Cooperation
The Élysée Treaty already provided for a rapprochement of military doctrines and cooperation in defense matters. This dimension was visibly concretized with the creation, in 1989, of the Franco-German Brigade (FGB). This binational unit, composed of soldiers from both countries, is a strong symbol of rediscovered trust and the will for common defense. The FGB has been engaged in various international missions, whether under the aegis of NATO (for example in Afghanistan) or the European Union (notably in Mali and the Central African Republic), and also participates in national assistance missions. Personnel exchange programs, joint training, and intensive language courses are organized to improve interoperability and mutual understanding within the brigade. The 2019 Treaty of Aachen further strengthened this cooperation in defense and security, underlining the commitment of both countries to act together against contemporary threats. The objective is to strengthen the common voice of France and Germany within alliances and to provide joint operational military capabilities.
Economy and Cross-Border Cooperation
While the Élysée Treaty already encouraged increased economic cooperation within the framework of the Common Market, the 2019 Treaty of Aachen gave new impetus to this dimension. It notably created new instruments to facilitate exchanges and deepen economic integration, such as the Franco-German Council of Economic Experts. Particular attention is paid to cross-border cooperation, with the establishment of a Cross-Border Cooperation Committee (CCC) tasked with identifying and removing obstacles to daily life and common projects in border regions. Initiatives are also underway to harmonize certain aspects of business law and coordinate policies on energy transition and innovation. The Franco-German University (UFA/DFH), although not directly resulting from the initial treaties, supports hundreds of binational courses and joint research, contributing to the training of a bicultural European elite.
These multiple initiatives, and many others (town twinnings, joint research projects, etc.), illustrate the depth and vitality of the Franco-German partnership. They show how a strong political will, enshrined in treaties, has been able to translate into concrete achievements that have profoundly transformed the relations between the two countries and their societies. This growing interdependence, woven at multiple levels, has made the idea of a return to hostility not only unthinkable but structurally very difficult. The transition from the Élysée Treaty to that of Aachen also demonstrates an ability to adapt this cooperation, seeking to respond to the new challenges of the 21st century while reaffirming the fundamental commitment to a common future.
7. Understanding the German Attitude: Beyond Justification
Describing the Franco-German relationship and drawing lessons from it also involves seeking to « understand the attitude of the Germans without justifying it, » as the query requests. This is a complex task, as the German attitude has evolved considerably over the centuries, shaped by specific historical experiences, ideological currents, and changing geopolitical contexts. It is not about excusing the mistakes or crimes of the past, but about analyzing the factors that may have influenced German perceptions and actions.
The Weight of Successive Humiliations
A common thread in German history, from the early 19th century to the mid-20th, is the feeling of national humiliation. The crushing of Prussia by Napoleon, symbolized by the defeats of Jena and Auerstedt and the diktat of the Treaty of Tilsit, left a deep wound. This experience was lived as an intolerable debasement for a proud military power. More than a century later, the Treaty of Versailles was perceived by an overwhelming majority of Germans as a new humiliation, a « Diktat » imposed by revanchist victors. The loss of territories, the crushing reparations, the military limitations, and especially the war guilt clause were felt as a flagrant injustice. This feeling of having been unfairly treated, whether these perceptions were entirely founded or not, constituted a powerful psychological and political driver. It fueled a desire for the restoration of power, national honor, and a mistrust of neighboring powers, especially France. These narratives of victimization, whether they came from Napoleonic Prussia or Weimar Germany, were powerful mobilization tools, used by different political forces to justify their agendas.
The Quest for Unity and Identity
For much of its history, « Germany » was a mosaic of more or less sovereign states. The quest for national unity was a central theme of the 19th century. This aspiration was often built in opposition to external powers, and France, as a powerful and often interventionist neighbor in German affairs, frequently played the role of this « other » against which the German identity sought to define itself. Intellectuals like Fichte helped to forge a German cultural and linguistic identity that transcended state borders, laying the foundations for a nationalism that would later be politically instrumentalized. The unification achieved by Bismarck in 1871, although accomplished « by iron and blood » and at the cost of a war against France, represented the culmination of this long national aspiration.
Revanchism as a Driving Force
The desire to « avenge the affront » is a recurring theme in the history of Franco-German relations, on both sides. While France lived in anticipation of revenge after 1871, Prussia had already known this feeling after 1806. Bismarck’s rhetoric linking Sedan to Auerstedt, and later, Hitler’s use of the same type of historical references to justify his aggressions, illustrate how the memory of past defeats was used to legitimize present and future conflicts. This dynamic maintained a cycle of violence and reprisals.
The Impact of Totalitarian Ideologies
It is crucial to emphasize that the German attitude under the Nazi regime (1933-1945) represents a radical rupture and perversion of earlier nationalist currents. Nazism certainly exploited the frustrations born of the Treaty of Versailles and the desire for national greatness, but it grafted onto it a racist, anti-Semitic, expansionist, and genocidal ideology that led to crimes of unprecedented scale. Understanding how a nation could descend into such barbarism is a complex exercise that goes beyond a simple analysis of Franco-German relations, but it is undeniable that the breeding ground of humiliation and instability of the interwar period facilitated Hitler’s rise to power.
The Post-1945 Evolution: From Guilt to Responsibility
The total defeat of 1945, the revelation of the extent of Nazi crimes, and the division of the country marked a fundamental turning point. In the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), a deep and painful process of confronting the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) began, albeit gradually and not without resistance. The acceptance of historical responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich, the will to break with militarism and aggressive nationalism, and the resolute commitment to democracy and European integration characterized the policy of the post-war FRG. Leaders like Konrad Adenauer embodied this will for redemption and the reconstruction of a new German identity, peaceful and European. Reconciliation with France became a central pillar of this new orientation, with Germany seeking to redefine itself not in opposition, but in partnership within a united Europe.
The German attitude, therefore, cannot be understood as a monolithic block. It is the product of a complex history, marked by traumas, national aspirations, ideological drifts, but also by a capacity for self-questioning and profound transformation. France, as an immediate neighbor and major power, constantly played a role, sometimes as a model, sometimes as a rival, sometimes as an adversary, before becoming an essential partner in the redefinition of Germany’s identity and place in Europe.
8. Lessons from a Shared History: From Trauma to Common Responsibility
The history of Franco-German relations, with its alternations of bloody conflicts and periods of rapprochement, up to the spectacular reconciliation after World War II, is rich in lessons that go far beyond the bilateral framework. These lessons concern the nature of international conflicts, the conditions for peace, and the mechanisms of cooperation between nations.
- The Destructiveness of the Humiliation-Revenge Cycle: The most blatant lesson that emerges from this history is the futility and extreme danger of the infernal cycle where the humiliation inflicted on one nation inevitably sows the seeds of a desire for revenge, leading to new conflicts. From the crushing of Napoleonic Prussia which fueled Prussian revanchism until Sedan in 1870, to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine which fueled French nationalism until 1914, then to the « Diktat » of Versailles which contributed to the rise of Nazism and the conflagration of 1939-1945, each affront prepared the next. This spiral of violence demonstrates that a peace founded on the humiliation of the vanquished is a precarious and illusory peace.
- The Crucial Importance of Political Will and Visionary Leadership: The Franco-German reconciliation after 1945 was not the result of chance or a natural evolution of mindsets. It was the result of courageous political decisions, carried by leaders such as Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. These statesmen, despite the weight of past suffering and the ambient mistrust, had the vision and determination to break with the logic of confrontation. Their ability to overcome historical traumas and propose a new paradigm of cooperation was decisive. This underlines that peace and reconciliation are above all political constructs that require courage, perseverance, and a long-term vision.
- The Role of Memory, Mutual Recognition, and Dialogue: To break the cycle of hatred, it is essential to engage in a work on memory, however painful it may be. This involves the recognition of the suffering inflicted and endured, and even of one’s own wrongs. General de Gaulle’s speech to the German youth in Ludwigsburg in 1962, where he recognized both the greatness of the German people and the « great faults » of its history, is an example of this approach. An honest and respectful dialogue on the divergent interpretations of the past is a necessary condition for building a peaceful common future. The ability of nations to move beyond narratives of unilateral victimization to engage on the path of forgiveness and mutual understanding, as illustrated by the dynamic between de Gaulle and Adenauer, is a fundamental lesson.
- The Strength of Human, Cultural, and Educational Ties: Reconciliation cannot be limited to agreements between governments; it must be rooted in civil societies. Initiatives such as the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO), which has allowed millions of young people to meet and get to know each other, the cultural channel ARTE, the countless town twinnings, and university exchanges have created a dense fabric of human relations. These links help to deconstruct stereotypes, promote empathy, and build a mutual understanding that is the best antidote to prejudice and hostility. Investment in youth and education is a long-term investment in peace.
- European Integration as a Framework for Peace and Shared Prosperity: By inscribing their reconciliation and cooperation in the broader project of European integration, France and Germany found a way to overcome their national antagonisms. The European Union has provided an institutional framework for managing disputes peacefully, developing common interests, and pooling sovereignty in certain areas. This integration process has transformed former enemies into indispensable partners, demonstrating that supranational cooperation can be a powerful vector of peace. The stability and progress of the European Union are, moreover, intrinsically linked to the solidity of the Franco-German couple; a weakening of this « engine » would have significant repercussions on the entire continent.
- The Need for Permanent Vigilance and Continuous Adaptation: The achievements of Franco-German reconciliation, however solid they may be, should never be taken for granted. As former German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas pointed out, one should not rest on one’s laurels. The rise of nationalism, populism, and hate speech in Europe and around the world requires a constant commitment to Franco-German friendship and European values. The relationship must be constantly maintained, adapted to new challenges, and reinvented, as evidenced by the 2019 Treaty of Aachen, which aims to deepen cooperation in the face of the challenges of the 21st century. Reconciliation is an active and continuous process, not a final state.
The Franco-German history thus offers a powerful testimony to the ability of peoples to overcome the deepest hatreds and the most severe traumas to build a future of peace, cooperation, and shared prosperity. It is a lesson of hope and responsibility for the contemporary world.
9. Conclusion: The Franco-German Relationship, a Legacy in Perpetual Motion
At the end of this analysis of the Franco-German relationship, from the Napoleonic era to the present day, several major observations emerge. Characterized for centuries by the seal of the « hereditary enemy, » this relationship was the scene of a succession of devastating conflicts, mutual humiliations, and bloody revenges. From the Prussian crushing at Jena and Auerstedt, followed by the harsh Treaty of Tilsit, to the French defeat at Sedan in 1870 and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the Treaty of Frankfurt, then to the « Diktat » of Versailles imposed on Germany in 1919, and finally to the catastrophe of World War II with its procession of horrors and the new humiliation of France in 1940, Franco-German history seemed locked in a tragic cycle.
The German attitude, throughout these ordeals, was shaped by a deep sense of injustice and humiliation, an ardent desire for national unity and recognition, which, instrumentalized by extremist ideologies, could lead to the worst excesses. Understanding these dynamics, without ever justifying the unjustifiable, is essential to grasp the complexity of this past.
Yet, this history is also that of a radical and exemplary transformation. The Franco-German reconciliation, initiated after 1945 and sealed by the Élysée Treaty in 1963 thanks to the vision and courage of leaders like Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, demonstrated that it was possible to break the fatality of antagonisms. This rapprochement was not just a political act; it was embodied in a multitude of concrete initiatives touching on youth (FGYO), culture (ARTE), defense (Franco-German Brigade), and the economy, weaving unbreakable ties between the two societies.
The lessons to be drawn from this history are numerous and of burning relevance. They highlight the toxicity of exacerbated nationalism and the humiliation-revenge cycle. They shed light on the paramount role of political will, dialogue, mutual recognition of suffering, and a shared work of memory. They prove the strength of human and cultural exchanges in building understanding and trust. Finally, they illustrate how integration into a larger common project, in this case, European integration, can allow for the transcendence of bilateral rivalries and the forging of a shared destiny.
Today, the Franco-German couple, despite occasional divergences and the challenges posed by a changing world (rise of populism, economic crises, questions of European sovereignty), remains, as the initial query pointed out, the « engine of Europe. » The 2019 Treaty of Aachen testifies to the will to continue and adapt this unique cooperation to contemporary challenges. The Franco-German relationship is not a fixed achievement, but a legacy in perpetual motion, a shared responsibility that requires constant commitment to preserve peace and promote a united, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Its journey, from the deepest hostility to the closest friendship, remains a source of inspiration and a model for international relations.
Joël-François Dumont
