![- Poutine chef mafieux 3 Vladimir Poutine — Portrait d'après une photo de Gavriil Grigorov (Sputnik)](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Poutine-chef-mafieux_3-678x381.jpg)
EN LIGNE DE MIRE
![- Poutine chef mafieux 3 Vladimir Poutine — Portrait d'après une photo de Gavriil Grigorov (Sputnik)](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Poutine-chef-mafieux_3-678x381.jpg)
![- francoise thom 3b2 Françoise Thom sur LCI](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/francoise-thom_3b2-678x381.jpg)
La grande imposture russe
Guerre en Ukraine
![- Zelinsky 25x1a Volodymyr Zelenski - Photo Dmitri/X](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Zelinsky_25x1a-326x245.jpg)
La guerre d’Ukraine
Au début de l’hiver météorologique 2024-2025, l’hiver est également politique pour l’Ukraine, avec la perspective de l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump en janvier 2025.
L’incertitude sur l’issue du conflit se double d’un fort pessimisme. L’Ukraine pourra-t-elle tenir sans le soutien américain ?
Les récentes décisions du président Biden — autorisation de frapper le territoire russe avec des missiles ATACMS et livraison de mines anti-person-nel — arrivent bien tard pour produire un réel effet stratégique à court terme. Elles constituent un desserrement des contraintes exercées sur la stratégie ukrainienne par les Occidentaux mais ne traduisent pas son réel affranchissement, souhaité ici depuis plusieurs mois. Il demeure inaccessible à court terme.
Point de situation après l’élection de Donald Trump avec le Vice-Amiral Christian Girard (2S). […]
![- Koursk Patrick Chappatte 1 Koursk © Patrick-Chappatte](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Koursk_Patrick-Chappatte_1-326x245.jpg)
Percée vers Koursk : une nouvelle stratégie ukrainienne ?
Depuis l’échec de la contre-of-fensive ukrainienne de 2023, la situation semblait figée sur le front terrestre malgré les faibles et couteuses avancées actuelles des forces russes dans le Don-bass en direction de Pokrovsk. La percée ukrainienne en direction de Koursk constitue une surprise stratégique dont les détermi-nants ne sont pas clairement identifiés : affaiblissement local russe, identification par le renseignement ukrainien d’une zone de moindre résistance adverse, renforcement des capa-cités offensives ukrainiennes, nouvelle stratégie ukrainienne ? Pour l’amiral Girard, cette percée tactique qui est une prise de risque, actuellement favorable à l’Ukraine, constitue une rupture dans le déroulement de la guerre sans que l’on puisse aujourd’hui dire si elle sera déterminante pour l’issue du conflit. Elle soulève d’impor-tantes interrogations. La pre-mière est celle de sa finalité Elle apparaît en première analyse comme une prise de gage en vue de négociations diplomatiques ultérieures. […]
![- DR 2024 08 07 CSCIS 1 DR_2024-08-07_CSCIS](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/DR_2024-08-07_CSCIS_1-326x245.jpg)
How Russian Special Information Operations Try to Undermine Mobilisation in Ukraine
EUvsDiSiNFO opens its columns to the Ukrainian Centre for Strategic Communication and In-formation Security. The purpose of the CSCIS is to strengthen national resilience and combat information and disinformation threats in collaboration with public institutions, civil society organisations and international partners. The Kremlin’s informa-tion manipulation operations with disinformation targeting mobilisation with disinformation to undermine public trust in Ukrainian authorities. Manipu-lative antimobilisation messages spread on TikTok and Telegram often include a kernel of truth to give more credence to the Kremlin’s lies. Since the begin-ning of Russian hybrid aggres-sion against Ukraine in 2014, Russian state security services have targeted Ukrainian mobili-sation. Moscow has launched disinformation operations plan-ting messages in the Ukrainian information space to undermine trust in the country’s military political leadership. […]
LES DERNIÈRES CHRONIQUES
![- DR 2024 08 23 Playing games in Africa 1 DR-2024-08-23_Playing games in Africa](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DR-2024-08-23_Playing-games-in-Africa_1-326x245.jpg)
Playing Games in Africa
Real-world scenarios in computer gaming push Russia’s expansionist agenda to a tech-savvy youth audience. As signatures dry on a new defence pact between Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, online gamers can play with these countries’ destinies in virtual reality. In July, a Russian gamer with associations to the Kremlin’s propaganda outlet Africa Initia-tive released the African Dawn game patch for the popular strategy game Hearts of Iron 4 (HOI4). The objective of the patch is the creation of an alliance of Sahel states online against the pressures of the Economic Community of West African States and Western powers. Playing as the leaders of the countries in the Sahel, players also fight local separatist and terrorist networks. If successful, the virtual country receives military and economic support from Russia. African Dawn sets out Russia’s agenda for Africa – to increase its influence and discredit Western partners. […]
![- 2024 0823 23 AUG Ribbentrop Stalin Molotov cover 1 2024-0823-23-AUG-Ribbentrop-Stalin-Molotov-cover](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/2024-0823-23-AUG-Ribbentrop-Stalin-Molotov-cover_1-326x245.jpg)
23 August – Black Ribbon Day, or the European Day of Remembrance
23 August, the European Day of Remembrance, marks the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. 23 August is a special day for historic events in Europe. The European Day of Remembrance, also known as Black Ribbon Day, honours the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany concluded the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its Secret Supplementary Protocol that carved up Central and Eastern Europe into spheres of control between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Days later, on 1 September 1939, the Second World War began in Europe. Persistent attempts, both in the USSR and in present-day Russia, have tried to deny the Pact’s Protocol. When forced to recognise its existence, the Kremlin diminishes or relativises its importance […]
![- DR 2024 08 12 Georgia Foreign agents 1 DR_2024-08-12_Georgia Foreign agents](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DR_2024-08-12_Georgia-Foreign-agents_1-326x245.jpg)
Georgia: The Next Colour Revolution?
A nervous government in Georgia co-opts the Kremlin narrative and repeats its lie that the EU is pushing a ‘regime change’ agenda in Georgia. False accusations of starting ‘colour revolutions’ is one of the oldest tricks in the Kremlin’s disinformation playbook. Earlier this month, on 1 August, a contentious law on ”transparency of foreign influence” took effect in Georgia. The law imposes unduly strict controls on civic groups that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad, designating them as ‘organisations carrying out the interests of a foreign power’. This includes local civil society organisations as well as the media. The organisations are subject to burdensome and disproportionate reporting require-ments and sanctions for non-compliance. The extensive inspections powers given to state autho-rities create a chilling effect, potentially stifling and eliminating organisations critical of the government. […]
![- DR 2024 0810 Olympic games cover 1 DR_2024-0810_Olympic games cover](https://european-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DR_2024-0810_Olympic-games-cover_1-326x245.jpg)
The Kremlin Shills Demonise the Paris Olympics
Pro-Kremlin disinformation targets the Paris Olympics with baseless homophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric to discredit the Games, accuse the West of moral decrepitude and portray Russia as a victim of Russophobia. The Olympics are a time of inspiration and joy for most people around the world. At the Kremlin, however, disinformation spreaders are grumpy. Their athletes could not bear the Russian flag because of Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine. So the Kremlin slanders the Paris games and everything about them. The Kremlin has also tried other ways to discredit the Paris games with disinformation narratives. The common denominator was to engage in unashamed mud-slinging. Pro-Kremlin TV host Vladimir Solovyov, for example, attacked the opening ceremony with homophobic slurs, calling the French leadership the ‘faggot movement’ […]