The Drunken Ship Facing the Kremlin Iceberg

Faced with the Kremlin’s master, American diplomacy looks like a ‘drunken ship’. The Anchorage summit was a tragicomic illustration of this. Donald Trump, who boasted that he could end the war in 24 hours with disconcerting naivety, fell into the trap set by Vladimir Putin. The latter, a cold-blooded strategist and adept at the ‘salami technique’ of cutting his prey into pieces, knew how to exploit the vanity and short-term vision of his American counterpart. The report by Laure Mandeville,[1] special correspondent for Le Figaro in Anchorage,[*] is one of the best analyses available illustrating this ‘diplomacy of humiliation’. To better understand the Kremlin strategist’s objective, read Laure Mandeville’s article and refer to Françoise Thom’s analysis in Le Monde,[2] which completes the picture.

The Anchorage Gambit: Anatomy of a Self-Inflicted Humiliation

by Joël-François Dumont — Paris, le 18 août 2025 —

Introduction: An Arctic Yalta in the Making

The summit convened in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 2025, was presented to the world under the banner « In Pursuit of Peace. »[1] In reality, it was an exercise in the opposite. It was not a negotiation between equals but a meticulously executed Russian psychological operation that culminated in a strategic triumph for the Kremlin and a profound, self-inflicted humiliation for the United States. The event laid bare the ascendancy of a calculating master of the Kremlin over the « drunken boat » of American diplomacy.[1] What transpired on the tarmac of Elmendorf-Richardson Air Force Base was a masterclass in political stagecraft, where the primary product was not a diplomatic outcome but a set of powerful images and narratives designed for global consumption. Vladimir Putin did not travel to Anchorage to talk to Donald Trump; he traveled there to perform for the world, using the American president as a prop in a drama of his own country’s debasement.

Conférence de presse Trump Poutine — Photo kremlin.ru
« Putin does not see Trump as an interlocutor but as a tool » — Photo kremlin.ru

The spectacle was as telling as it was jarring. The leader of a nation waging a brutal war of aggression, a man wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, was received not with the cold formality befitting an international pariah but with a profusion of honors.[1] The rolling out of the red carpet, the personal welcome from President Trump, the ride in the presidential Cadillac, and the decision to grant Putin the first word at a press conference where questions were banned—each element was a carefully chosen visual. These were not standard diplomatic courtesies; they were calculated acts of legitimation, offered with no discernible concession in return. The setting itself, on the former Russian territory of Alaska, added a layer of symbolic irony that was almost certainly not lost on the Kremlin’s planners.

The Russian state media’s subsequent conclusion—that the summit signaled the « normalization of Russo-American relations » and the full reintegration of their leader into the international game—was not mere propaganda; it was an accurate reading of the performance’s intended effect.[1] The fundamental failure of the American diplomatic apparatus was its inability to recognize that it was on a stage, not at a negotiating table. By agreeing to the summit under these conditions, the United States had already conceded the central point: that the aggressor and his victim’s defender are moral and political equals. The summit was an unmitigated failure for American interests, but for Vladimir Putin, it was a resounding success before he even spoke a word. It has dangerously damaged U.S. credibility, emboldened a revisionist adversary, and placed the entire European security order in grave peril.

I. The Anatomy of a Diplomatic Debacle

The failure of the Anchorage summit was not a matter of bad luck or an unexpected turn of events; it was pre-ordained by a catastrophic combination of American naiveté, strategic incompetence, and a diplomatic model based on presidential ego rather than coherent national interest. The Trump administration entered the meeting having already surrendered on the most critical points, demonstrating a profound and dangerous misunderstanding of its adversary, the nature of the conflict, and the basic tenets of power diplomacy. The entire endeavor was built on a foundation of ignorance, epitomized by the president’s campaign promise to end the war in Ukraine in « 24 hours »—a boast delivered with a lightness and naiveté that only the truly uninformed can possess.[1]

The groundwork for the debacle was laid by an emissary, Steve Witkoff, whose evaluation of the Russian position demonstrated a « stunning incompetence. »[1] The American side proceeded as if a deal were there for the making, contingent only on the persuasive powers of its leader. This belief stemmed from a fatal case of narcissistic projection, aptly summarized by one observer: « Since flattery works on him, Trump thought it would work on Putin! ».[1] This substitution of personal vanity for strategic analysis is the hallmark of a diplomacy unmoored from reality. The American team failed to grasp that Putin, a product of the KGB, is not susceptible to flattery but is, in fact, an expert practitioner in using it to manipulate others.[3]

The most damning failure, however, was the pre-emptive strategic capitulation that occurred before the summit even began. The Trump administration abandoned the logical and necessary demand for a ceasefire as a precondition for talks. Instead, in a stunning reversal, Trump rallied to the very idea promoted by Putin: direct negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement while the war rages on.[1] This decision was not a minor tactical concession; it was a fundamental surrender. It allows the Kremlin to « continue to pound the cities of Ukraine » while engaging in the fiction of a peace process.[1] It grants Russia the strategic luxury of negotiating with a gun to Ukraine’s head, using the daily destruction and death as leverage.

Les délégations amérciaine et russe à Anchorage — Photo kremlin.ru
« A catastrophic combination of American naiveté, strategic incompetence, and a diplomatic model based on presi-dential ego rather than coherent national interest » — Photo kremlin.ru

This was not merely a tactical error but a profound conceptual one. The U.S. administration fundamentally mistook the nature of the conflict, viewing it as a transactional dispute to be resolved rather than a war of conquest to be won or lost. Putin had been explicit about his objectives, stating his determination to attack the « deep roots of the conflict. »[1][2] This coded language was correctly interpreted in the analysis as a demand for the total subjugation of Ukraine: the annexation of four regions in addition to Crimea, a forced renunciation of NATO membership, and Russian oversight of its demilitarization. Putin’s goal is existential and non-negotiable. The American team, operating under a commercial mindset, believed a « deal » was possible where both sides could claim a victory. This is a category error of historic proportions. By agreeing to negotiate on Putin’s terms, the United States implicitly accepted the Russian premise that Ukraine’s sovereignty, its territory, and its future are negotiable commodities. This is not a step towards peace; it is the first, decisive step towards a forced surrender. The summit’s « indecent » slogan, « In Pursuit of Peace, » was a lie from the start, for it was convened on the terms of the man who single-handedly unleashed the war.[1]

II. A Tale of Two Leaders: The Transactionalist vs. The Tsar

The personal dynamic between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is not a relationship between peers; it is a clinical study in psychological manipulation. The Anchorage summit provided a stark illustration of how Putin, the cold-blooded, long-term strategist, has masterfully identified and exploited the vulnerabilities of Trump, the hot-blooded, short-term transactionalist. This fundamental asymmetry in character, worldview, and strategic objective dictates the outcome of every interaction, ensuring that American interests are consistently subordinated to Russian ones.

The two men are products of entirely different worlds and operate on different cognitive planes. Trump is described as a « hot-blooded emotional, » a leader who relies on visceral instinct, manages by sight, and is willing to change course abruptly based on mood and immediate feedback.[1] His worldview is fundamentally transactional; he believes that international relations are a series of deals and that a combination of personal charm and commercial logic can resolve any conflict. He seeks to entice Putin onto the « terrain of rationality » without comprehending the degree to which irrational passions, historical grievances, and messianic ideologies drive his counterpart.[1]

Putin, in stark contrast, is a « cold-blooded animal. »[1] A former KGB officer, he is disciplined, calculating, and patient, sizing up his adversary well in advance and playing a long game. His preferred terrain is not the boardroom but the battlefield of hybrid warfare and psychological destabilization.[1] While both leaders can be seen as insurgents against the post-1991 globalized order, their goals are diametrically opposed. Trump, representing a Western populist revolt, seeks to renegotiate America’s terms within that order for greater economic benefit. Putin, the arch-insurgent of the anti-West, seeks to destroy the order itself through imperial restoration, cloaking his aggression in the language of anti-colonialism while practicing the most naked form of imperialism.[1][2]

Poutine radieux, Trump le regard vide — Photo kremlin.ru
Trump, an ‘impulsive and emotional man,’ a ‘short-term opportunist’ focused on the immediate, alongside a radiant Putin, who thinks long term and methodically implements his strategy — Photo kremlin.ru

This contrast is most evident in their strategic horizons. Trump is a « transactional short-termist, » focused on the immediate win and the next news cycle. Putin « thinks long-term, » patiently executing a strategy to make Ukraine capitulate and dismember it piece by piece using the « salami technique. »[1][2] He is willing to endure economic degradation and political isolation to achieve his historical aims. Trump’s persistent and mystifying « fascination » with Putin, a phenomenon dating back to 2015, remains a key vulnerability, with explanations ranging from a genuine affinity for authoritarian rule to darker theories of past recruitment by Russian services.[1]

Ultimately, Putin does not see Trump as an interlocutor but as a tool. He understands that Trump’s primary psychological need is not a specific policy outcome but the constant validation of his own ego and genius. By providing this validation—through praise, the spectacle of a summit, and the illusion of a special relationship—Putin can effectively « hire his American interlocutor » to advance Russian strategic goals.[1] For Putin, Washington is simultaneously the « major interlocutor » and the « fundamental enemy. »[2] This is not a contradiction. He needs the United States at the table to ratify his conquests and lend them legitimacy, but his ultimate objective is the diminution of American power and the collapse of the U.S.-led international system. He masterfully uses the personal relationship with the American president to achieve the strategic goal of defeating the United States.

III. The Battle for Washington’s Soul: Realists, Hawks, and the Drunken Boat

The erratic and self-defeating nature of American policy towards Russia is not merely a product of the president’s temperament; it is the external manifestation of an unresolved ideological war raging within the American conservative movement. The « drunken boat » of American diplomacy is steered not by a consistent strategic vision but by President Trump’s unpredictable vacillation between two fundamentally opposed camps. On one side are the « MAGA realists, » who advocate for a « low-cost peace » and are willing to sacrifice Ukrainian territory for a quick end to the conflict. On the other are the « Reaganite hawks, » who understand the existential threat posed by Putin’s revanchist regime and advocate for a policy of firmness.[1] This internal schism creates a strategic vacuum that adversaries are quick to exploit, rendering U.S. policy dangerously incoherent.

The « realist » argument is articulated by figures like Mario Loyola of the Heritage Foundation. This school of thought posits that Russia is merely « retaking its rights to its historical territory » as Ukraine pivots to the West.[1] In this view, Ukraine’s independence was tolerable to Moscow only as long as it remained aligned with Russia. The loss of Crimea and the land bridge connecting it to Russia is presented as an unacceptable strategic blow that Moscow was bound to resist. The conclusion drawn from this premise is that the only viable solution is for Ukraine to trade these territories for a guarantee of its diminished independence. This argument is often coupled with an isolationist appeal, suggesting that the United States has « no particular strategic interest in Ukraine » and that the conflict and its associated sanctions are needlessly complicating more important strategic relationships with countries like India and China.[1]

Poutine et Trump à Anchorage - Photo Kremlin.ru
‘Rewarding aggression only breeds more aggression’ – Photo Kremlin.ru

This perspective, while cloaked in the language of realism, is based on a profoundly ahistorical and strategically myopic foundation. It accepts the Kremlin’s imperial framing of the conflict at face value, legitimizing a war of aggression as a defense of « historical territory. » It dangerously ignores the foundational principle of international security that rewarding aggression only begets more aggression—as the old adage warns, « appetite comes with eating. »[1]

Naufrage dans l'Arctique pour le Trump & Co — Illustration © European-Security
It kept bowing to the waves, until it finally gave them a final kiss — Illustration © European-Security

Counterbalancing this faction is the continued influence of Reaganite hawks within the administration, personified by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who represents the « wing of firmness. »[1] It is largely credited to this group’s rear-guard action that the Anchorage summit did not immediately devolve into a full-blown « Yalta of the Arctic, » with Trump explicitly endorsing a Russian-dictated carve-up of Ukraine.[1] Their presence ensures that a debate continues, but it does not produce a coherent policy.

The result is a president who, « Depending on the moment… seemed to lean toward one camp or the other. »[1] This constant vacillation means that U.S. policy is not proactive but reactive and, critically, defensive against itself. An ally like Ukraine, or indeed any nation attempting to navigate its relationship with Washington, cannot build a long-term strategy on such a foundation of sand. It creates a perverse situation where Kyiv and European capitals must expend as much diplomatic energy and political capital on lobbying and managing factions in Washington as they do on fighting the Russian invasion. This internal American paralysis is not a bug but a feature of the strategic landscape for Moscow. Putin does not need to defeat a coherent American strategy; he only needs to wait for its internal contradictions to paralyze it or, as in Anchorage, swing it decisively in his favor. American unreliability has become a key Russian strategic asset.

IV. Ukraine on the Precipice: Between a Diminished State and a Vassal State

As a direct and immediate consequence of the Anchorage summit, Ukraine faces an existential choice, one imposed not by its enemy, but by its principal ally. The United States is no longer acting as a steadfast guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty but has become the primary vector of pressure on Kyiv to accept a peace settlement that involves the permanent loss of territory and a fundamental compromise of its national aspirations. This dramatic shift has forced European allies into a desperate damage-control operation, scrambling to salvage a diminished but defensible Ukrainian state from the grim alternative: its complete subjugation and return to Moscow’s sphere of influence as a vassal state.

The starkness of this choice has been laid bare. The Wall Street Journal is cited as summarizing the two possible scenarios now on the table: « Ukraine could lose territory but survive as a sovereign and secure country, albeit diminished. Alternatively, it could lose land and sovereignty. »[1] This framing, now prevalent in Washington, signals a readiness to accept the permanent amputation of Ukrainian territory as a legitimate price for peace.

This is not merely an analytical assessment; it is now official, if informal, U.S. policy, communicated directly from the top. When asked what advice he would give to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following the summit, President Trump’s response was brutally direct: « Accept the deal. Russia is strong. It’s a great power, not Ukraine. »[1] This statement represents a complete abandonment of the principle that aggressors should not be rewarded with the spoils of their aggression. It transforms the role of the United States from that of an ally providing the means of resistance to that of an enforcer, threatening to cut off the victim’s lifeline unless they submit to the aggressor’s core demands.

Trump Poutine_Patrick Chappatte ©
Will Europeans just give in and accept the unacceptable?
Patrick Chappatte isn’t feeling optimistic — © Patrick Chappette (La Tribune Dimanche)

In response to this American pressure, European leaders are converging on Washington to argue against accepting the « unacceptable. »[1] Their strategy is not to win a total victory but to secure the least bad outcome. The European counter-proposal is a pragmatic and painful compromise: the acceptance of a long-term ceasefire along the current line of contact, which would leave occupied regions under de facto Russian control without granting de jure recognition of Moscow’s sovereignty. In exchange for this immense concession, they seek the implementation of « strong security guarantees » that would allow the remaining 80% of Ukraine to survive, rebuild, and defend itself as an independent nation.[1]

Into this fraught dynamic, President Trump has injected a new and deeply ambiguous element. In a surprising reversal of previous White House policy, he has proposed American participation in these security guarantees—a move described as a « rare piece of good news. »[1] However, their « exact content remains vague, » with possibilities ranging from robust commitments to mere logistical and military aid for European contingents. This ambiguity is the central battleground for Ukraine’s future. The offer of a U.S. security guarantee is profoundly contradictory to the simultaneous pressure on Zelensky to « accept the deal. » This creates a severe risk that a weak, ill-defined American guarantee could be used as a diplomatic fig leaf—a tool to persuade Ukraine to agree to permanent territorial losses in exchange for a promise of security that proves hollow when tested. The future of a free Ukraine now hinges on the fine print of a security deal being negotiated under extreme duress, promoted by an unreliable American administration, and dictated by the timetable of an aggressor. This is not a recipe for sustainable peace, but for a future conflict on terms even more favorable to Moscow.

Conclusion: The Echoes of Anchorage and the Price of Weakness

The Anchorage summit inflicted damage on the United States and the Western alliance that is both strategic and profoundly symbolic. By conferring legitimacy upon an aggressor and signaling a retreat from its core principles, the United States has broadcast a message of weakness, incoherence, and unreliability to both allies and adversaries across the globe. Anchorage was not a standalone diplomatic blunder; it was a potential watershed moment, a public ratification of revisionist power politics that threatens to unravel the entire post-Cold War security architecture.

The symbolic humiliation was palpable and deeply felt by seasoned observers of international affairs. Strategist Andrew Michta captured the sense of shock and shame, asking: « It was unbearable to watch… is this really my country that lets itself be humiliated by prostrating itself before a former KGB officer who is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people? ».[1] This sense of debasement is not merely an emotional reaction; it has tangible strategic consequences. The spectacle validated Putin’s brutal methods, allowing Russian media to declare his successful reintegration into the « international game » and cementing his status at home as a leader who can bring a superpower to heel.[1]

The most dangerous strategic consequence of Anchorage is the severe erosion of deterrence. For decades, global stability has rested on two pillars of American power: its immense military and economic capability, and the credibility of its commitments. While U.S. capability remains formidable, the summit has inflicted a grievous wound on its credibility. Michta’s pained question— »Have we become weak and incompetent to this point? »—is precisely the question that will now be debated in the strategic councils of Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang.[1] If the United States is unwilling to bear the costs of upholding the principle of national sovereignty in Europe, a core American strategic interest for over a century, where on Earth will it be willing to do so?

Poutine et Trump à Anchorage — Photo kremlkin.ru
The Anchorage summit inflicted damage on the United States and the Western alliance — Photo kremlin.ru

The message sent from Anchorage is that American commitments are negotiable, its principles are malleable, and its foreign policy is contingent on the transactional whims of its leader. This perception creates a far more dangerous and unstable world. It validates the core belief of autocratic revisionists: that the West is decadent, divided, and lacks the strategic patience and moral clarity to stand against determined aggression. It lowers the perceived cost of expansionism and invites adversaries to test American resolve elsewhere, creating fertile ground for miscalculation and wider conflict. The warning that rewarding aggression is a fool’s errand because « appetite comes with eating » has been cast aside.[1] The crucial details being debated in the aftermath of the summit are not of local significance. As the analysis concludes, in these moments, « the future of Europe and the free world is perhaps being decided. »[1] It is being decided because the nation that has long underwritten the security of that world has signaled that it may no longer be willing, or able, to pay the price of leadership.

Joël-François Dumont

Sources and Legends

[1] Mandeville, Laure. « À Anchorage, l’ascendant du maître du Kremlin face au bateau ivre de la diplomatie américaine. » Le Figaro, August 18, 2025, p. 2.

[2] Thom, Françoise. « Poutine, la stratégie du chaos et le piège ukrainien. ». : The Trump administration is in the process of rescuing Putin’s regime, which it needs in order to extort money from Europe, according to the historian, ahead of the meeting between Trump and Putin » in Le Monde, August 14, 2025, p. 22. (The Anchorage Gambit: Anatomy of a Self-Inflicted Humiliation) Le Monde, August 17, 2025.

[3] Voir « Anchorage – Un sommet de symboles, pas de substance » — (2025-0816) —

[*] Laure Mandeville holds a degree in Russian and Polish and is a graduate of the Institut d’études politiques de Paris and Harvard University. She was a correspondent for Le Figaro in Moscow (1997-2000). Head of the America desk in Washington (2009-2016), she has been in charge of major investigations on Europe and the United States at Le Figaro since 2017. She has published several books, including one on Donald Trump that is well worth rereading…

  • L’Armée russe, la puissance en haillons, 1994, No 1
  • La Reconquête russe, Paris, Grasset, 2008 (Prix Louis-Pauwels 2009)
  • Qui est vraiment Donald Trump ?, Paris, Éditions des Équateurs, 2016 
  • Les Révoltés d’Occident, Paris, Éditions de l’Observatoire, 2022 
  • Quand l’Ukraine se lève, avec Constantin Sigov, Paris, Talent Éditions, 2022

See Also:

In-depth Analysis:

The Anchorage Summit, held on August 15, 2025, between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, is presented by Laure Mandeville as a « tragicomic illustration » of American diplomatic failure. Far from being a negotiation, it was a « meticulously executed Russian psychological operation » resulting in a « strategic triumph for the Kremlin and a profound, self-inflicted humiliation for the United States. » The summit exposed the « ascendancy of a calculating master of the Kremlin over the « drunken boat » of American diplomacy, » with Putin using Trump as a « prop in a drama of his own country’s debasement. » The core message is that the US, driven by presidential ego and strategic incompetence, inadvertently legitimized Putin, eroded its own credibility, and dangerously imperiled the European security order by pressuring Ukraine to accept territorial concessions.