War in Ukraine: Time for diplomacy?

15 mai 2025 Amiral Christian Girard

At the behest of the newly re-elected American tsar, the time seems ripe for diplomacy while the war continues in Ukraine amid indifference from most of the European public, both on the front lines and at home, with the bombing of civilian populations and industrial infrastructure.

by Admiral Christian Girard (2s) [*] — Toulon, May 15, 2025 —

Insidiously in Europe, and particularly in France, beyond the lamentations about the horror of war, the eternal argument of pacifists, who would be better called defeatists — a party that inevitably emerges during wars waged by democracies and existed, for example, in France at the end of the First World War, which Clemenceau was able to combat — a significant portion of the latter present themselves as “realists.” The military impasse in which Ukraine finds itself, unable to drive the Russian invader out of its territory, would justify waving Pope Francis’ white flag. The same people, who are not averse to contradiction, celebrate the vision of De Gaulle who, in June 1940, with France on its knees militarily, took up the torch abandoned by the Vichy regime and continued the war with the Allies until the Liberation and the defeat of the Nazi enemy. The argument of strategic deadlock—unequal in any case—was, until recently, that of the US administration, used to urge the Ukrainian side to accept negotiations with Russia on ignominious terms.

The time for negotiations

Has the time for negotiations really come? Has the strategic situation evolved sufficiently for them to lead to a lasting cessation of fighting, assuming they take place and produce concrete results, as the May 15 meeting in Istanbul suggests?

On the American side: complete uncertainty

The only new geostrategic factor does not come from the military situation but from US policy.

Donald Trump en Arabie saoudite — Capture d'écran
Trump: Between tactical reversals and long-term vision, Make Business Great Again… — Screenshot

The latter seems to want to bring the US closer to Russia, to the detriment of Ukraine. It led to the decision to halt military support to force Ukraine to negotiate, fortunately for a relatively short period, but this had consequences on the ground, with an immediate devastating effect in the field of intelligence.

On the Russian side, a clear geopolitical project

Vladimir Poutine au Kremlin - Conférence de presse la nuit au Kremlin — Capture d'écran
Vladimir Putin’s nighttime press conference at the Kremlin — Screenshot

The asymmetry of this conflict, previously analyzed in terms of military strategy, is even more unbalanced at the political level by the new situation: on the Russian side, a clear geopolitical project, rooted in geography and historical continuity, which is far from achieving its objectives, particularly in Ukraine; on the side of Ukraine’s supporters, there is still the same lack of objectives and positive strategy, the same weak will to prevent Russia from winning without clearly stating the need for its defeat, despite the relative hardening of the latest statements by the French president and the strengthening of defense policies in European countries, as well as the rise of counterpart industries. However, these factors can only produce results in the medium to long term. Finally, there is complete uncertainty about the US’s game plan regarding the future of its support for Ukraine.

The US desire to impose negotiations a priori can only be interpreted by Russia as a sign of weakness in the balance of power. Its refusal to accept a ceasefire is proof of this. Its strategy remains unchanged: to continue the military confrontation until the Ukrainian army collapses.

On the European side

European countries and Ukraine itself, aware of their short-term weakness without US support, want to appear to be pursuing the goal of an immediate ceasefire, hoping that by aligning themselves with President Trump’s objective, he will, in yet another U-turn, stop adopting the Russian “narrative” and increase the support that Ukraine needs more than ever. However clever this may seem in terms of communication, for Russia this policy is nothing more than a further admission of weakness. The possibility of a shift in US strategy is entirely random. It is a mistake to think that the US president’s multiple reversals, which could be described as “tactical,” reflect a lack of long-term vision. The fact is that, regardless of who is in power, Ukraine is of very limited importance to the United States in its global geopolitical vision. The very notion of a Western camp is no longer relevant in the current circumstances, as previously analyzed. Ukraine appears to be nothing more than the subject of a new “deal” intended to boost the US president’s standing with the American public.

Rencontre de Kiev avec Zelensky le 10 mai 2025
A geopolitical three-way alliance? Meeting in Kiev on May 10 — Photo: Ukrainian Presidency

What is emerging today is therefore a kind of geopolitical ménage à trois between three unequal partners, or at least three, as China and Turkey could also be involved. The game is therefore even more complex. It would be a mistake to think that the determining factors are purely psychological, even if this may be important.

VA Christian Girard — Photo © DR

Hopes for a coalition of democracies willing to support Ukraine are fading due to a lack of concrete, short-term proposals that are independent of the US’s medium-term plans. These same nations are hesitant to take a stance independent of the US, particularly the UK, which is a central member of the coalition. Furthermore, European public opinion, apart from that of Russia’s immediate neighbors, has not really grasped, or refuses to see, the seriousness of the issues at stake in the Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, President Trump’s diplomatic activism is setting the pace.

Admiral Christian Girard — Photo © DR

This does not mean that the voluntary coalition cannot play a role in the medium term. But it must set clear and positive objectives for Europe’s security and Ukraine’s future vis-à-vis Russia, independently of the United States.

Looking ahead to the next NATO summit

NATO remains the strategic reference point for most countries, even though its organization remains under US control. It is doubtful that the desired reflection can come from within a possible European pillar, a “caucus” that has always been rejected by the Anglo-Saxon side. The next NATO summit in June will be a decisive test in this regard.

President Zelensky — Screenshot
A flawless performance for Zelensky, whose unwavering determination poorly conceals a certain isolation — Screenshot

It therefore seems urgent for the coalition of volunteers to regain the initiative and not allow itself to be drawn into diplomatic initiatives over which it has no control, particularly in the event of an agreement negotiated directly between the US and Russian presidents over the interests and opinions of European countries and, above all, Ukraine. In the short term, therefore, it is a question of providing military assistance to Ukraine with NATO resources, if possible, i.e., if the Americans do not oppose it, but without NATO resources as an alternative.

One idea, proposed in the UK, is to deploy air defense assets on a permanent basis in Ukraine’s neighboring countries, which would intervene in support of Ukrainian systems against Russian missile and drone attacks, as was done recently to defend Israel.

A reinforcement of the military resources deployed in the same countries neighbouring Ukraine would also strengthen the deterrent role of the forces already present.

The conditions for diplomatic negotiations that would produce concrete positive results do not appear to be in place at present. The US’s attitude in the face of probable failure is difficult to predict. However, the need to find ways to enable Ukraine to stand up to Russian aggression remains a pressing necessity for the coalition of the willing.

Christian Girard

See also:

[*] Vice Admiral (2s) Christian Girard: A graduate of the École supérieure de guerre navale (Naval War College), where he was a professor, he has also served as military advisor to the Directorate of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A specialist in maritime operations, he was responsible for the training of surface vessels under the admiral commanding the naval action force, where he later became deputy director general, a position he created. His last position in the Navy was deputy chief of staff for operations and logistics at the Navy Staff. In this capacity, he was the first ALOPS, admiral in charge of naval operations.

Admiral Christian Girard is the author of four books: “L’île France – Guerre, marine et sécurité” (France Island – War, Navy and Security), published in 2007 by Éditions L’Esprit du livre in the Strategy & Defense Collection. In 2020, “Enfance et Tunisie” (Childhood and Tunisia) (not commercially available). In 2022, “Ailleurs, récits et anecdotes maritimes de la fin du XXe siècle” (Elsewhere, maritime stories and anecdotes from the end of the 20th century) and finally, “Cailloux stratégiques” (Strategic pebbles). To purchase “Ailleurs, récits et anecdotes maritimes de la fin du XXe siècle” and “Cailloux stratégiques,” order on Amazon.

Christian Girard

Analysis by Admiral Christian Girard (2s):